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Abstract 
Linguistics has prioritized the auditory mode of transmission in language at the expense 
of written forms and their relevance to the social construction of meaning and identity. 
Due to the privilege of spoken language as the least-mediated form of symbolic 
expression, the significant role non-verbal linguistic communication plays in social life 
is often overlooked. Through the perspectives of cognitive and perceptual forms of 
epistemology, written forms of language can and do influence reception to non-verbal 
utterance in a socially significant manner. Ideologies of language predispose linguistic 
and anthropological research against considerations of written linguistic artifacts and 
their roles in constituting ascribed social meaning. Signed forms of utterance are 
constrained by standardization and grammaticality, which in turn iconize and erase 
written language variation. When written variation is intentionally produced, it creates 
perceptually derived, ideologically charged responses that affect social attitudes and 
discourses. I address the methods and foci of sociolinguistic research for their 
pertinence to non-spoken language. I then analyze variation in written language in the 
domains of audiovisual animated media and African American dialect literature to show 
how socially significant responses to written variation create stratification by 
constructing fictive speech classes which are indexed to real speech communities. This 
investigation aims to clarify how modes of language transmission share properties 
assumed to be domain-specific, as well as to warrant a reexamination of the 
phonocentric concept of language in linguistic anthropology. As written forms of 
language are central to digital media, traditional sociolinguistic research must account 
for the written word just as it does the spoken.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 In 2009, just before his inauguration as President of the United States, Barack 
Obama visited Ben’s Chili Bowl, a Washington landmark restaurant. He handed the 
cashier a $20 bill and when offered change remarked, “Nah, we straight” (Samy Alim & 
Smitherman 2012). Obama, the first black President, has been repeatedly praised for his 
articulation and poise, yet his divergence from standard American grammar in this 
instance is indexical of an African American vernacular that he chooses to perform on 
rare occasion in professional discourse. This selective presentation of identity has not 
escaped the public eye, most notably in an assertion by former Senate Majority Leader 
Harry Reid, who said that Mr. Obama speaks “with no Negro dialect, unless he wanted 
to have one” (Samy Alim & Smitherman 2012).  
 The social conveyance of language is often absent from descriptive linguistics. 
Documentation of languages tends to focus on cataloging phonological, morphological, 
and syntactic elements with the aim of devising a grammatical rubric that posits the 
structural accuracy to the target tongue. Generative grammar studies how these 
elements combine to create an encoded message, the character of which can be reduced 
and replicated in any other code of choosing. I argue that such approaches to the study 
of language omit viable and necessary information not inherent in utterance, but rather 
in social signification. Furthermore, “language” in academic study is frequently 
dichotomized as scientific in the domain of linguistics and stylistic in the domain of 
humanities. This equivocation of the concept of communicative language creates an 
imbalance in the functions, intents, and usages of speakers when the goals of research 
involve merely an ascription of what is or is not permitted in such a fluid field of 
2 
 
inquiry. Furthermore, it erects a barrier between speech and writing, depriving authors 
of linguistic authority in cases where language transmission is not firmly located within 
face-to-face interlocution.  
 The following exploration into the differences in method and focus, empiricality 
and exclusion, and multimodal transmission of utterance aims to differentiate between 
forms of “language” so often considered only vocal. I espouse a perceptual, cognitive 
perspective that involves not only that which is uttered, but how utterances create and 
are created by social meanings. I do not assert that this or that type of speech is more 
“true” than others, but merely that the social implications of language exceed the 
denotation of bounded phrases and grammatical rules. Beyond the mode of 
transmission, I examine a survey of cases both historical and current to expose how 
language shapes social praxis as it is not only constructed but received by auditors. To 
meet these ends, I examine methodological practices of language research, theories of 
meaning and conceptualization, the relationship between speech and speaker, and forms 
through which language creates a discourse space that transcends what is said in favor 
of what is meant. This multidisciplinary approach combines linguistics, cultural 
anthropology, philosophy, literary studies, and media discourse analysis in a holistic 
interpretation of hermeneutical import. I examine the concept of language not as a 
shared set of mechanical practices of interpretation, nor as a property of a specific 
cultural community, but rather as the heuristic device through which we experience 
shared social reality—the engine that drives systems of meaning. As such I rely on 
linguistic examples as evidence of signification within social practice. Fragments of 
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language thus serve as the trail of bread crumbs (always located in a specific time and 
place) that lead to the abstract meanings shared in exchange.  
 When language is spoken, hearers notice and accommodate accent and dialect 
variation as they perceive differences in pronunciation and grammatical forms. Sensory 
observation mediates perception and associations between speaker, speech, and 
semantic content form cognitive frames in the minds of interlocutors. These frames can 
establish correlations between speech forms and categorical classes of speakers based 
on the variant features they display, iconizing speech forms as essential properties of 
speech communities. However, written language is filtered from displaying variation by 
ideologies of standardization. Variation in the written language has the same potential 
to correlate perceived utterance forms to speech communities (both real and imagined), 
but standardization erases variation, favoring unmarked forms in adherence to 
grammaticality. When variation surfaces in written forms, it is often dismissed as either 
ungrammatical or as an idiosyncratic stylistic device employed by the author. Because 
non-standard language in the written form produces associative judgments in the auditor 
that index real or perceived speakers and speech communities, linguistic anthropology 
should recognize that written language variation is both a symbolic representation of 
populations and ideologically charged. 
 In the second section I analyze sociolinguistic approaches to language research. 
The emphasis on plotting and dividing speech variation reveals a strong preference for 
assumptions of uniformity, geographically-bound categorization, and selective attention 
to social factors considered non-linguistic. I contrast these approaches with folk 
linguistic surveys of perceptual dialectology that analyze a listener-oriented, affective 
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account of response to utterance (instead of production alone). Examples of non-
linguistic interference in the form of sensory observation demonstrate how what is seen 
augments what is said. This tradition established the 20th century dominant view of 
language as an encoding of universally translatable statements parsed into specific 
grammars. Because phonological research exclusively studies oral usage and syntactic 
research centers on structural forms, logocentric views of utterance overlook the 
significance of form in written variation in favor of its semantic content. 
 In the third section, I detour to trace the history of philosophical models of 
thought. As my argument centers on the transmission of meaning and not merely 
language, I survey how various systems of knowledge have been defined and described. 
Unlike the sources examined, I am not to discover objective truth, but rather to provide 
a framework for positing how socially accepted meanings can come to be considered 
real. The bridge from phenomenology to cognitive grammar combines perception, 
production, intention, and response in discourse interpretation. This foray involves 
observation of features, category construction, and the derivation of knowledge by 
empirical analysis. It pertains to my argument in that cognitive frame generation is 
perceived at the individual level and conventionalized at the social level, establishing 
socially normative views of natural phenomena (including speech forms) as perceived 
rational truth. 
 In the fourth section, I examine documentary linguistic studies of indigenous 
North American cultures. The cases cited demonstrate the association between speech 
forms and speakers as well as speakers’ intentional usage and awareness of variant 
forms. The distribution of speech forms attached to loaded features creates a space in 
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which characteristics of individuals and relationships between community members are 
indexed through that variation. This socially meaningful practice is evidenced through 
language and enculturation. Because variation in spoken forms indexes real or 
perceived speech communities, enculturated views of speech practices create 
stratification through ideology. The association between speech forms and classes of 
speakers become normative as culturally endorsed belief, iconizing speakers of variant 
forms. 
 In the fifth section, I investigate representation of speech and accent in media. 
This includes some discussion of narrative, performance, and adaptation with regard to 
narrative authority. It also involves the perception of symbolic content and the 
mitigation of affective features inherent in spoken language as they appear in written 
form. This challenges the seeming uniformity of language as a concept by means of its 
modality. The focus on animated media demonstrates how perception constructs 
ideology through symbolic representation of imagined speech communities. The focus 
on written forms arises in subtitling in cases that present an audio track in one language 
and subtitles written in a different language. Herein the semantic content of dialog that 
accompanies the visual display is transmitted through the written form instead of the 
spoken. 
 In the sixth section, I trace the treatment of dialect in African American 
literature as indicative of ideological practice. A history of the tradition is compared to 
the social and political concerns of race relations in the United States through the mid-
20th century. This pairing of history and entertainment demonstrates how fictive works 
negotiate social realities and (rein)force social stratification through representative 
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modeling. Dialect representation in the written form indexes perceived speech 
communities, iconizing the reader’s view of extant community members whether or not 
they truly produce the essentialized features. Associations between speech forms and 
communities create ideologically charged frameworks in written language, further 
iconizing indexed social groups as associations of spoken forms are recursively 
transferred to written forms. As written standardization erases variation, when variation 
arises in written forms, it socially marks the indexed speech community members as 
others. 
 In the seventh section, I return to linguistic scholarship as it tends to differences 
between the empirical and the subjective, especially as those differences pertain to the 
divide between written and spoken language. I engage once again with how language is 
both meaningful without denotation and meaningless without connotation. This includes 
the treatment of academic research in language and theories of grammar as well as 
representation in texts of both fact and fiction. Discussion of grammaticality and 
logocentrism demonstrates how 20th century linguistic research is inherently biased in 
favor of language structure over communicative competence. This bias erases variation 
in written forms, emphasizing the grammatically correct and reducible content of 
written utterance over its surface form. 
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Chapter 2: From Sociolinguistics to Perceptual Dialectology 
 Linguistic research in the past century has largely focused on deciphering the 
components of grammatical structure, including sounds and their combinations 
(phonology), the composition of words (morphology), and the order in which words 
take meaning in phrases (syntax). Sociolinguistic research purported to take these 
linguistic features and establish meaningful correlations between grammatical structure 
and populations that adhered to those structures. Yet without a greater regard for 
context and respondent attitudes, studies that correlated speech variation to populations 
failed to document the pertinence of variation in favor of mapping where delineations 
between dialect barriers exist. Language attitude surveys, folk linguistics, and emphasis 
on perception reveal socially perceived meanings indicative of the role of language in 
interaction as opposed to merely serving as a codified transmission of thought. This 
chapter illustrates ways in which documentary studies in variation fail to consider the 
social import of constructing meaning from utterance, and how some of the mediating 
factors of communication and comprehension provide greater insight into language as a 
psychosocial exchange. 
 William Labov’s “Social Stratification of (r) in New York City Department 
Stores” (1972) introduces the “rapid and anonymous” survey method for acquiring 
linguistic field data. In an attempt to discern whether previously researched social 
stratification in New York’s Lower East Side would be reflected by speech patterns, 
Labov cataloged the locations, advertisements, and prices of various sales items in three 
venues representative of different socioeconomic classes. Then he would approach 
employees at each site and inquire as to the location of some item or department that he 
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had previously determined to be located on the fourth floor. Feigning difficulty hearing, 
he would solicit a more emphatic repetition of the response before sneaking away to 
transcribe the interaction. The focus of the study was the postvocalic retroflex liquid 
sonorant /r/, a known feature of the New York accent believed the local speech 
community shared. 
 With attention to methodology, Labov notes the observer effect in face-to-face 
speech interviews, anticipating that the method of data collection influences the data 
collected. The appeal of the rapid and anonymous survey is such that it diminishes the 
attention to speech and thus presumably negates performative aspects of speech 
augmentation. Further manipulation of the data and the experimental variables show 
Labov’s considerations for his vaguely defined “class” as they intersect with race, age, 
occupation as filter for customer accessibility, and the longitudinal prestige of /r/-
deletion in New York. 
 Labov concludes that /r/-deletion in the postvocalic position (pronouncing car as 
[kaˑ] instead of [kaɹ]) indicates association with a lower socioeconomic class, though 
this is mitigated through a variety of factors. The elicitation method he used provides 
very little background about the speaker other than visual observations. Thus, 
approximation of age among informants supports a hypothesis of shifting prestige in the 
dialect feature, wherein the older generation considered /r/-deletion more favorable. 
Regarding the race of speakers, Labov (who has contributed greatly to the academic 
corpus of African American Vernacular English, or AAVE) notes the greater number of 
black employees at S. Klein than at Macy’s, with fewer still at Saks, and posits that “the 
presence of many black informants will contribute to the lower use of (r-1)” (Labov 
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1972:54).  Job title and duties further complicate who speaks to whom in this study; 
while managers, stockers, and cashiers directly interact with customers at S. Klein, 
cashiers and stockers are entirely removed from customers at Saks. Labov compares the 
data from these elicitations (recorded in 1962) with interviews and field research from 
the Lower East Side in the years following to establish consistent patterns of the New 
York dialect. 
 Elements of this study remain unclear. While Labov points to the speech 
community of native New York speakers of American English, residents primarily of 
the Lower East Side of New York City, whom exactly does this data represent? Labov 
himself attests to the difficulty in answering this question, rebutting that “our population 
is well defined as the sales people (or more generally, any employee whose speech 
might be heard by a customer)…” resulting in “the overall social imprint of the 
employees upon the customer” (Labov 1972:49). This is vague. The “Occupation” 
subchapter reveals the most homogenous demographic group of the study: 141 native 
New York, white sales-only women of 264 informants (Labov 1972:55). Though 
clearly attuned to interference from variables he hopes to exclude, Labov does not 
construct his target speech community identity in much greater detail. This is 
misleading both in the study and my critique. Labov’s conclusions assume an indexical 
referent of the average New York speaker, one whose dialect reveals some status 
stratification based on an observable feature. Without devolving into the minutia of 
non-existent dialects versus common co-occurrence of idiolect features, it seems certain 
that while “the New York accent” seems straightforward as an index, there is no distinct 
referent that we could call a “community” in the ethnographic sense (nor do I consider 
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this remotely ethnographic—I use the term in contrast). If there were a direct referent, 
Labov’s exclusions (those with distinct regional or foreign accents) show the majority 
as native New York, white sales-only women. Regarding the background of his 
informants, he confesses that context like “birthplace, language history, education, 
participation in New York culture, and so on” (Labov 1972:57) remains unknown, 
which raises the question of how he can accurately label them “native New Yorkers,” 
let alone posit whether this speech is natural and indicative of a New Yorker. 
 This study seems so neatly to define the correlation between /r/-deletion and 
class in New York, but privileges certain biases in method at the expense of clarity in 
attaching the perception to a referent. The distribution of the phenomenon is clear, but 
the interpretation of the phenomenon regarding identity is lacking. Labov does not 
insinuate that employees are specifically coached to perform these linguistic features, 
though he entertains notions of limitations regarding which individuals can occupy 
which roles in each instance. He describes himself as a participant (Labov 1972:49) but 
considers himself a constant in the experiment, dressed as a middle-class, white male 
from New Jersey, and /r/-pronouncing. He notes that French and western European 
accents appear in Saks, that Jewish and eastern European accents appear in S. Klein, 
and that four Puerto Rican employees participated: one from Macy’s and three from S. 
Klein. Informants with heavy accents are excluded from the study (as they are not 
representative of the New York accent), yet the social stratification of the excluded 
speakers hints at other disparities. In addition, Labov’s conclusions assume divisions of 
upper-middle class, lower-middle class, and working class in New York as a 
microcosm. Labov assigns social classes to the stores based on the newspapers in which 
11 
 
each advertised and how much they advertised, both in quantity and price. He points to 
the conjunction of Saks Fifth Avenue with both New York’s fashion district and the 
fashion industry as factors increasing their prestige without considering if that prestige 
has any relevance to the New York accent. Moreover, the data from the department 
stores was elicited 10 years prior to the article’s publication, during which time Labov 
more deeply researched and elucidated the intricacies of establishing a shared speech 
community identity. 
 While considered canonical for methodology of sociolinguistic elicitation, this 
study (and the method itself) does not reveal much social context. There is no concern 
for the state of civil rights at the time and how that affected potential employment. 
There is no analysis of how the interviewer’s own signifiers affect the responses; how 
might his identity as a middle-aged white male have affected the speech patterns of the 
sales clerks with whom he interacted. Labov does not posit a “crafted image,” although 
he seems to move toward that. Labov’s theories about what the customer perceives are 
of great interest, but raise a question of deixis. Who is evaluating prestige, and how is 
that person situated within that domain? Do these stores cater specifically to New 
Yorkers or persons who share the presumed New Yorker ideologies of social 
stratification based on class? Are any of these participants aware of the phenomenon at 
all, and if so, to what extent have they evaluated it for themselves? Is the “prestige” that 
Labov claims even prestigious, or just expensive? 
 The point here is not to disparage Labov’s study, but to note that the variables 
that he correlates do not provide a distinct association between a group of people, a 
social value, and a linguistic feature. That Saks is the most expensive of the three stores 
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is evident from Labov’s introduction. That Saks has the highest frequency of (r-1) of the 
three stores is evident from the data. But attaching that correlation of price and 
frequency to the store itself does not entail that it is a source of prestige for the New 
York accent. Ironically, it may even signify that the New York accent, considered 
prestigious by some, would be seen as provincial and commonplace for an international 
business such as Saks. Perhaps it is more informative that western European accents 
appear only in Saks while Jewish and eastern European accents appear more commonly 
in S. Klein. Perhaps this is due to the political spectrum of the world at the time, when 
Eastern Europe was still girded by the Iron Curtain of the USSR. Similarly, the field 
data collection occurred in November 1962 (Labov 1972:44), five months before the 
publication of Dr. Martin Luther King’s Letter from a Birmingham Jail. The more in-
depth interviews with residents of New York City’s Lower East Side transpired in 1966, 
while Labov’s study printed in 1972, almost half a decade after President Lyndon 
Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1968. The brief attention given to race does not 
pretend to account for the social configuration of race at the time, though his later 
research emphasizes its significance in speech practices. Labov excuses himself from 
further interpretation on this front by exhorting the rapid and anonymous style as 
incompatible with such an analysis. While generative linguists content themselves with 
the empiricality of language because an extant speaker uttered some phrase (or the 
linguist imagined a phrase they deem acceptable as a native speaker), the attachment of 
that utterance to the speaker and its associative social values disappears from view. This 
case in particular begins with certain assumptions about what the New York accent is, 
who speaks it, and who authorizes those determinations. The distribution of /r/ in New 
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York City department stores is not about New Yorkers. It is about those persons 
perceived as the embodiment of New Yorkers based on a single feature of speech bound 
to the history of a geographic place, one that distinctly deviates from the 20th century 
epitome of speech variation authority: non-mobile, older, rural males (NORMs). 
 The primary variable in sociolinguistic studies of the 20th century was 
geography. Accents are labeled for place, not for gender, religion, or education. The 
hypothetical phrase “Wow, I just love your female accent!” is nonsensical in the 
English language, despite the correctness of its syntax. Replace “female” here with 
“Christian” or “college” to receive the same result, though Labov distinguishes a Jewish 
accent among participants from S. Klein. Labov does not clarify whether that represents 
a linguistic, religious, or ethnic identity. In so doing, he has left us with little knowledge 
about what the New York accent is with regard to who speaks it. It also remains unclear 
whether New Yorkers have any knowledge of or attitudes towards speech, whether the 
department stores surveyed have policies and preferences regarding speech practices, 
or, for that matter, whether these department stores have a corporate view of New York-
ness that they must uphold through representative means. Even if corporate policies 
existed for the stores in question, the attitudes regarding community inclusion, 
exclusion, and representation are relinquished to the periphery of the speech event. 
Labov makes no mention of intentionality among the informants, whether they actively 
model their speech patterns to promote a certain persona or whether they have been 
selected for employment because of compliance with such a persona, or even whether 
or not the speech behavior of the employees in each store actually does contribute to the 
“overall social imprint of the employees upon the customer” (Labov 1972:49). Instead, 
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he claims that Saks has the highest prices and most controlled avenues of access to non-
interactive personnel, and where prices are the highest, you hear the postvocalic (r-1) 
more consistently than in the lower-price venues. If sales price alone is enough to 
warrant value and justify the “overall social imprint” experienced by the customer, 
where are the testimonies of customers who have experienced this social imprint? 
Labov, as the sole investigator, accounts for 100% of the “customers” in the study.  
 The emphasis in mid-20th century sociolinguistic studies centered on boundaries 
of accent and dialect variation. Attempts to divide geographic territory by salient 
phonological and lexical variation aimed at grouping similar features to the places in 
which those features were unmarked in common speech. This perspective retains an 
inherent speaker-oriented bias and does not sufficiently explore whether any 
significance to variation exists, either for speakers or their addressees. Furthermore, it 
assumes a spatially-dominated categorization of speech communities, literally mapped 
by predominant dialect features. Beyond the delineation of dialect regions, little is 
revealed about the impact and import of speech variation, especially within diverse, 
national-level languages. 
 That dialect variation exists is evident, and while there is a strong correlation 
between linguistic diffusion and geographic distribution, those factors are continuously 
challenged as mass communication and mobility expand horizons for linguistic 
transmission beyond spatial constraints. Given the multifaceted concept of identity, 
locating a speech feature to a geographically bound population reveals little about the 
presumed speech community if the uniting factor is residential proximity alone. If 
speech communities are limited to being residents of locales identified by linguistic 
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quirks, such investigations serve few purposes beyond a cartography of othering, and 
speech forms that break from a standardized normative without further elucidation on 
why they arise and the significance they bear to members and non-members remain 
shrouded in mystery. Sociolinguistics clearly correlates variant speech forms to 
populations, but does not necessarily impute the significance of variation and the 
configurations of speech patterns as they influence social life beyond oral transmission. 
 In contrast to speaker-oriented methods of quantification, perceptual 
dialectology asks listeners about their subjective responses to samples of dialect speech. 
The divide is one of positivistic objectivity versus social psychology; by taking into 
account the opinions and attitudes of listeners as speech is perceived, we gain insight 
into the social conceptualization of dialect speakers. This “folk linguistics” tactic 
demonstrates that speech as it is perceived can have more potent social salience than 
documentation simpliciter and clinical elicitation studies. By highlighting listeners’ 
responses to speech and their conjecture about speakers, the differentiation of social 
norms and evaluation of deictically standard speech practices inform relationships 
between speech communities as they appear to each other because of contrasting dialect 
features. Linguist Henry Hoenigswald called for such an approach in 1966: 
We should be interested not only in (a) what goes on (language), but also in (b) 
how people react to what goes on (they are persuaded, they are put off, etc.) and 
in (c) what people say goes on (talk concerning language). It will not do to 
dismiss these secondary and tertiary modes of conduct merely as sources of 
error. (Preston 2006:521) 
While folk perceptions may not be admissible for grammatical concerns, they are 
significant in the social configurations that arise between communities and speakers 
who clearly differentiate between marked features. The point is not whether the 
attitudes constructed and derived from perceived speech reflect the assumed speakers, 
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but rather the observance of the constellations of social divergence drawn from and 
attributed to speech variation. 
 Language attitude studies—one branch of perceptual dialectology—focus 
specifically on listeners’ responses and ideas about the speech they hear. In attitude 
surveys about American dialects, Dennis Preston has found that perceptions of 
American accents are largely influenced by the listener’s background as the basis for 
their presumed standard of speech. In a 1986 survey, participants were given blank 
maps of the United States and asked to identify regions based on their understanding of 
speech practices. Participants were then asked to rate correctness and pleasantness of 
speech variation to determine which dialect features are bound to evaluative social 
judgments. Respondents (in this study, predominantly white first- and second-year 
undergraduates from Indiana) routinely identified the Midwest accent as the most 
correct and the Southern accent as the worst English in America (Preston 1986:237). In 
contrast, the same respondents posited that their native accent was far less pleasant than 
that of Southern speakers (Preston 1986:238). He notes:  
It is clear that the informants took this geographical task to be an evaluative 
rather than descriptive one. A glance at the labels makes this clear -words such 
as twang, slang, normal, standard, pidgin, drawl, proper, snob, regular, perfect, 
stuffy, and slurred abound. This prescriptive orientation offers a better 
explanation for which areas were recognized and the intensity of the recognition 
than any other single feature. (Preston 1986:238) 
Preston’s surveys reveal affective judgments about the types of speech found in dialect 
distribution throughout the United States, which are thus necessarily projected onto the 
persons associated with speaking those forms. 
 To isolate a single feature of perceived speech, Preston and Bartlomiej Plichta 
conducted surveys (2005) that resynthesized a single word (“guide”) with a single male 
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and single female speaker. The sample was augmented over seven stages to take the 
diphthong /ay/ to a reduced monophthong /a/, a commonly-known feature of the 
Southern drawl. Participants were then asked to guess at the geographical base of the 
speaker on a Northern/Southern axis as the samples were played in random order. The 
results of the experiment, even over a single word and its central vowel, showed 
remarkable attribution to diphthongized speech posited as Northern and monophthong 
speech as Southern (Plichta and Preston 2005:121). What this shows is that associations 
between perceived speech and assumptions about speakers (as well as aspects of their 
identity) can be drawn from socially-ingrained ideas about speech forms and features, 
even at the monosyllable level. A single vowel pronounced with gradated marked 
difference proves enough to alter the listener’s perception of the speaker. The concepts 
explored by Preston and other perceptual dialectologists build on the effects of language 
variation as they influence social configurations of presumed speech communities. 
 Oral differences are not the only mediating factors with regard to language 
attitudes and perceptual dialectology. To test sensory interference, Donald Rubin (1992) 
conducted an experiment as an optional credit assignment for undergraduate 
participants. The students listened to a single audio recording of a female native English 
speaker delivering a four minute mini-lecture. While the recording was played, an 
image of the presumed instructor was projected. Two photographs were used to test 
perceived ethnicity of the speaker, one with a Caucasian woman and one with an Asian 
(Chinese) woman, while the same recording was played. Rubin found: 
When they were faced with an ethnically Asian instructor, participants 
responded in the direction one would expect had they been listening to 
nonstandard speech. Evidence from the discriminant analysis suggests that 
participants stereotypically attributed accent differences - differences that did 
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not exist in truth - to the instructors' speech. Yet more serious, listening 
comprehension appeared to be undermined simply by identifying (visually) the 
instructor as Asian. (Rubin 1992:519) 
In this study, a purely non-linguistic factor (a still image of the attributed speaker) 
compromised the participants’ reactions to the same audio recording, demonstrating a 
visual interference with auditory perception with regard to ethnic cues not found in the 
uniform speech sample. The perceived differences were thus attributed to the speaker 
despite that those differences existed only in the minds of the audience. Visual sensory 
observation heightens associations between perceived speech variation and the 
individual speakers. This association extends to speech communities as individual 
speakers display (or are perceived to display) marked features in language use, 
potentially iconizing the social or speech communities of which they are members. 
 In a study by Harry McGurk and John MacDonald (1976), multimodal sensory 
interference compromised received speech in an audiovisual illusion that today bears 
the name the McGurk effect. McGurk and MacDonald recorded a video image of a 
woman whose articulatory anatomy (lips, etc.) produced the syllable [ga] in English. 
The video was dubbed with audio of the same woman pronouncing the syllable [ba] in 
English. Auditors of the video heard the syllable as [da] when the image was paired 
with the sound. The visual presentation of the voiced velar plosive [g] is mediated by 
the audio presentation of the voiced bilabial plosive [b], resulting in comprehension of 
the voiced alveolar plosive [d]. Participants would correctly identify the lip movements 
as [ga] when the video was muted and would also correctly identify the audio clip as 
[ba] with their eyes closed. This study demonstrates how perception of speakers and 
speech is not uniformly linked to the production of speech alone as it occurs in nature, 
but how it is mediated through visual sensory input. Furthermore, it raises questions 
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regarding the accuracy of language reception on the part of the observer. If the senses 
can obfuscate reception through multisensory interference, interlocution relies heavily 
on the ability of the hearer to grasp the speaker’s encoded message. 
 Whether cognition is influenced by sensory perception in the physical sense (as 
with the McGurk effect) or in the social sense (as with perceptual dialectology), 
language usage clearly transcends the dimensions of computational meaning alone. 
Distinctions between dialects, accents, and languages utilized in social exchange retain 
observably marked features, but these features are contingent upon an ascribed standard 
form of speech which varies between both individual speakers and more broadly their 
speech communities. While sociolinguistic research creates a map of sorts for 
demarcating salient boundaries between forms of variation, perceptual studies generate 
a legend for the map, exploring why and how those variations influence interaction 
between speakers. Furthermore, perceptual emphases reveal socialized conceptions of 
the populations who display marked features, conceptions that are deictically grounded 
in the vantage point of the observer. Sensory perception permits and negotiates our 
understanding of any uttered message, but also includes socialized connotations of 
variation as archetypal representations of speech community members. These 
archetypal representations in turn influence psychosocial response in interlocution and 
develop characterizations of speakers derived from features associated with their speech 
forms. 
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Chapter 3: Philosophical Bases for the Cognitive Construction of 
Meaning 
 The psychological relationship between a class of persons or characters and the 
sensory observation of features is that of association, which in turn attributes 
membership in that categorical class as justified by the production of the presumed 
features. To understand how this phenomenon occurs, we must be able to reason why it 
occurs. Herein we venture beyond the observation of an event into the rationale for both 
its possibility and interpretation. To explain the conceptualization of the event and its 
social import, we must examine the nature of both concept (in the mental sense) and 
event (in the physical sense). The cases examined further explore not how language is 
transmitted, but how it is processed by the auditor to formulate conclusions about 
categorization, causation, inductive reasoning, and rational justifications regarding the 
natural and social world. 
 This section will rely heavily on philosophy as a discipline. Whereas 
documentary linguistics aims to determine an abstract grammatical structure through the 
observation of spoken interlocution, my argument relies on a phenomenological 
approach to how we experience language usage. As such, the distinctions between 
forms of speech serve as evidence for perceived understanding—it is not the speech 
markers themselves that are important, but rather the conceptualization of the identity 
and properties of linguistic referents (be they people, events, or ideas), both as they are 
used by speakers and as they are received and processed by addressees. Ethnography 
shares this goal, though not always with the same terms or foci. While participant 
observation is the key to determining the social organization of a community and the 
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nature of its practices, ethnography succeeds when it reveals why the elements of social 
behavior have significance for community members, especially when that significance 
displays contrast or concordance with other communities. These “webs of significance,” 
as Clifford Geertz called them, illustrate the philosophy of communities as it applies to 
social praxis. 
 While philosophy has myriad themes, traditions, and perspectives, it is 
worthwhile to disentangle the threads so commonly clustered under this umbrella term. 
The ontological vein focuses on being; it can be called the study of things and existence. 
The epistemological vein focuses on knowledge; it deals with how we know what we 
know. The field of logic applies to reason and what manners of reasoning are sound. 
The branch of ethics deals with how to act—which practices should be supported and 
performed (NB: Philosophical ethics can be moral, but do not entail morality). 
Phenomenology differs from the four common fields of philosophy listed here in that it 
does not prescribe behavioral ethics, it does not restructure logical reasoning, and it 
does not directly investigate things that exist in the ontological sense. Instead, it deals 
with the perception of extant things and events as they are experienced by an individual 
or a community, and how that experiential perception yields a socially cohesive 
understanding of the natural world and how we engage that world as humans (Smith 
2013).  
 For the purposes of this inquiry, I involve elements of western philosophy in the 
fields of empirical and rational metaphysics. Though Aristotle had much to say 
regarding the presentation of experience through linguistic means, his Poetics set the 
precedent for the still-predominant view of language use via narrative in the domain of 
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the humanities. Countless scholars should be cited in tracing the history discourse 
analysis, but I begin with Descartes. 
 Rene Descartes (1596-1650) was the first major philosopher of the 
Enlightenment in the rationalist tradition. His Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) 
sought to prove the existence of the Judeo-Christian God as the basis for interpreting the 
natural world that we experience in daily life. Descartes began by rejecting all prior 
philosophical theory and even his own senses in the Meditations, hoping to find some 
principle upon which his deductions could be ascertained. The famous phrase “cogito 
ergo sum” is his conclusion in the first meditation: He posited his existence as a being 
in the world on the basis of his own thought. In essence, the action of thinking requires 
an actor to execute it; he must therefore exist. In the second meditation, Descartes 
examines a piece of wax, listing its odor, flavor, size, shape, color, and other observable 
characteristics. Then he draws the wax near to a fire and notes how its taste and smell 
vanish, it melts from an extended mass to a liquid, and it loses its color and its form. 
The piece of wax represents a concept that bears distinctly observable features when 
perceived by the senses. But the transformation of the wax in heat calls the validity of 
those sensory observations into question once the presumed features change. Descartes 
concludes that while we can perceive wax through the senses, it is not the wax that we 
perceive, but rather our mental “imaginings”—imaging or ideation, a mental 
representation—of it. Note that Descartes began his investigations in the darkness of 
solipsism; he still does not trust his senses, only that he is a thinking being who is 
capable of sensing.  
But I need to realize that the perception of the wax is neither a seeing, nor a 
touching, nor an imagining. Nor has it ever been, even though it previously 
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seemed so; rather it is an inspection on the part of the mind alone. This 
inspection can be imperfect and confused, as it was before, or clear and distinct, 
as it is now, depending on how closely I pay attention to the things in which the 
piece of wax consists. (Descartes 2009:46) 
In this passage Descartes distinguishes between the concept (“imagining”) of the wax 
and the specific physical piece of wax. He therefore challenges the identification of a 
concept with the primary and secondary properties displayed by that conceptual 
category, relegating the truth of the nature of the concept to the mind of the perceiver. 
“Thus what I thought I had seen with my eyes, I actually grasped solely with the faculty 
of judgment, which is in my mind” (Descartes 2009:46).  
 Descartes’ second meditation is significant in that it not only differentiates a 
category or set from a member or unique element of the set, but also by distinguishing 
ubiquitous or inherent features associated with category sets as mutable. While 
ultimately Descartes finds reason to trust his senses in the following meditations, he 
notes that the error of attribution in perception is one that transpires cognitively in 
reasoning based on sensory experience. He calls the mind “the faculty of judgment” by 
which knowledge about the world is obtained, noting its potential for fallacy. While 
there are flaws with Descartes’ theories and conclusions, the so-called Father of Modern 
Philosophy was aware that reality is not always as it appears to us, nor as we recall it 
within our mental faculties.  
 I include Descartes’ Meditations because his analysis of categorization 
regarding observable features pertains directly to how interlocutors perceive speech 
features and derive imagined categories of speech classes and communities. The piece 
of wax demonstrates a variety of shifting features, all of which are properties of wax. 
Just as variation in language is present from one speaker to the next, we recognize 
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seemingly essentialized features of language through observation of contextually bound 
samples of utterance. The observed features are not necessarily omnipresent in speech 
or evenly displayed among speakers, yet we form categorical conclusions about real or 
imagined speech communities because of distinctly marked features. 
 Following the rationalist tradition, which had based natural philosophy in innate 
reasoning as unwavering principles for true thought, the empiricist tradition came to 
prominence. Empiricists argued against rationalists by positing the existence of the 
world as proved by sensory experience, or that which could be empirically observed. In 
essence, if we as humans perceive it, things are real to the extent that our faculties for 
perception can discover their reality. This does not preclude innate reasoning, but rather 
differentiates between knowledge gleaned from reason alone and knowledge gleaned 
from experience. 
 David Hume (1711-1776) tackles the divide between reason and experience in 
the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748). While he discusses many 
topics, including free will, causation, probability, and miracles, Hume is perhaps most 
remembered for his appeals to “custom and habit” in the natural world. For the purposes 
of my argument, the chapters of the Enquiry that involve the origin of ideas, 
connections of ideas, and problems of induction are most pertinent. Hume relies on two 
key terms to express our engagement with thought: impressions and ideas. Impressions 
are those emotional and sensory experiences that are impressed upon us through our 
faculties of observation and feeling; they are strong, vivid, and real as we participate in 
them. Ideas are our memories, rational thoughts, and conceptualizations of things; they 
are weaker and more flexible than impressions, and are not guaranteed to be real. This 
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lack of “reality” in ideas can mean several things: that factual memories are distended in 
recollection or truth; that innate reasoning such as mathematical theory is valid but non-
existent in the physical world; or that we take for granted associations seemingly 
connected in folk life for which we have no true basis to assert. Hume holds that 
impressions provide us the wealth of knowledge which we then reconfigure in the form 
of ideas through the mechanisms of compounding, transposing, augmenting, and 
diminishing. 
 Though his attention to language is limited to disentangling the jargon of his 
predecessors and the appellations of categories, Hume wrestles with matters of 
cognition and perception. He calls into question the freedom of the mind to attribute 
characteristics it has never empirically encountered through an example of a missing 
shade of blue. Hume suggests that if a continuum of swatches of blue, running from 
darkest to lightest, were presented to an observer missing one gradation element in the 
series that the observer would be able to recognize the relative difference in saturation 
and conceive of the shade not included in the sequence, even if she had no prior 
impression with which to form the idea of the missing shade. While seemingly contrary 
to his prior claim that ideas are residually derived from impressions, this 
counterexample flows into Hume’s distinctions between true philosophy and the 
governing of laymen’s thoughts, which are governed by custom and habit as a result of 
generalized ideas. He claims: 
All ideas, especially abstract ones, are naturally faint and obscure. The mind has 
but slender hold of them. They are apt to be confounded with other resembling 
ideas, and when we have employed any term, though without a distinct meaning, 
we are apt to imagine that it has a determinate idea annexed to it. On the 
contrary, all impressions, that is, all sensations either outward or inward, are 
strong and vivid. (Hume 2009:540) 
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Hume continues to discuss the connection of ideas, which he claims arise from three 
principles of association: resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect. He notes that 
similar objects or sequential events will be recognized as sets or patterns through lived 
experience. These associations he labels “relations of ideas” and “matters of fact,” the 
former including non-existent rational truths (such as mathematical operations) and the 
latter derived from experienced phenomena. Matters of fact, in his view, are both 
contingent on real existence and ultimately fallible because the contrary of any matter 
of fact cannot entail a contradiction. His example is that the sun rises every morning. 
Just because it has done so repeatedly up until this point does not exclude the possibility 
that it will not tomorrow; this can only be verified after the presumed sunrise tomorrow. 
As such, he posits that matters of fact are based in perceived relations of cause and 
effect, which are sequentially bound in perception, and not warranted as true despite 
reoccurrence.  
 However, the underlying typology of these two associations deals with innate 
knowledge (a priori) and observed knowledge (a posteriori). Hume held that relations of 
ideas (analytical knowledge, like mathematics) are true by means of reason without 
necessary existence; matters of fact (synthetic knowledge, like the sun rising) which we 
obtain through rationalizing experience, cannot be proven by nature of conceptual 
entailment and must be observed to be verified. Hume then applies the lens of relations 
of ideas and matters of fact to the problem of induction, observing that we assume 
through inductive logic (and not by pure reason) that elements of sets necessarily bear 
similarity to each other by means of shared features, or that future events in sequence 
will play out the way they have in the past. He appeals to the common expectation of 
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patterned behavior as the nature of custom and habit—generalizations that tend to 
obtain in the real world despite no physically predictable proof that they will come to 
pass. As such, Hume holds that synthetic a priori arguments are impossible. Because 
they must be confirmed through observation, they must be classified as a posteriori. 
True reason, in his view, must be analytic (as relations of ideas), while induction is 
synthetic (as matters of fact). 
 While Hume does not discuss language in explicit detail, he builds on the 
psychological associations between perceived events and their social expectations. 
Correlation between observable events and their causes applies to perceived language 
variation as the expectations Hume asserts (custom and habit) extend recursively to the 
behaviors of real or imagined social groups and their members. Impressions in the 
minds of auditors form ideas about features of speakers and their speech communities, 
leading to expectations of similar behaviors by other members of the same perceived 
communities. Thus observation of variation through experience reinforces the presumed 
categories of persons bearing marked features whether or not all members of that 
category exhibit those features. 
 In his Critique of Pure Reason (1783), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) argues for 
the existence and necessity of synthetic a priori propositions if any scientific certainty is 
to be merited. This nomenclature is derived from two pairs of binary oppositions: that 
of the analytic/synthetic divide, and that of the a priori/a posteriori divide. The former 
deals with conceptual entailment while the latter deals with experiential observation. 
Any proposition can be classified as one of four potential types when the two binaries 
are defined for that proposition. A proposition is any statement that contains a subject 
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and a predicate; while this is, on one level, equivalent to the grammatical concept of a 
sentence, it more broadly involves a concept (the subject) and an attribution that applies 
to that concept (the predicate).  
 According to Kant, any knowledge that we as humans come to understand must 
be one of either two types: a priori or a posteriori. Kant holds that for each individual, 
experience is the progenitor of knowledge, which we retain as mental impressions. He 
questions: 
…whether there is any knowledge that is thus independent of experience and 
even of all impressions of the senses. Such knowledge is entitled a priori, and 
distinguished from the empirical, which has its sources a posteriori, that is, in 
experience. (Kant 1965:42-3) 
 
Kant’s aim here is to posit genuine rational thought that is not derived specifically from 
lived experience. For example, mathematic knowledge would fall under the domain of a 
priori, as it exists before and exclusive of physical experience, although experience can 
illustrate its truths. While significant for philosophy, Kant’s distinction of types of 
knowledge separates the rational from the empirical and is less critical for disciplines 
that assume systems of logic (whatever parameters they may observe) as granted 
faculties of human thought. 
 A proposition in which the predicate is contained in the subject is said to be 
analytic. Kant writes: “If I say, for instance, ‘All bodies are extended’, this is an 
analytic judgment. For I do not require to go beyond the concept which I connect with 
‘body’ in order to find extension as bound up with it” (Kant 1965:48). In Kant’s terms, 
“extension” refers to placement in extended physical space; thus for any object to have 
body, that body must be located in extended physical space. Because the concept of 
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having body entails a prerequisite of the concept of physical extension, the analytic 
judgment is considered an entailment.  
 Synthetic arguments, in contrast, include a predicate that is not entailed by the 
subject. Kant writes: “But when I say, ‘All bodies are heavy’, the predicate is something 
quite different from anything that I think in the mere concept of ‘body’ in general; and 
the addition of such a predicate therefore yields a synthetic judgment” (Kant 1965:49). 
This seems contrary to expectation given contemporary use of the term “body,” but for 
Kant’s argument, this includes non-existent and unobservable concepts such as 
geometric figures. Even when we learn geometry on a Cartesian plane in a mathematics 
course, we study and diagram representational images (icons) of non-existent entities 
that are defined by coordinate systems and measurements. Thus it is perhaps confusing, 
but not impossible for Kant to speak of a body that has no mass. Note also that Kant 
uses the term “heavy” to describe an object that has mass, as opposed to an object that is 
comparatively difficult to lift or move. An imaginary geometric figure cannot be heavy 
in the definitions of physical science—it has no mass. Therefore, in the proposition “All 
bodies are heavy,” the predicate “heavy” modifies the subject phrase “all bodies” with a 
concept that is not originally entailed within that subject. This is the meaning of a 
synthetic judgment. 
 Kant’s propositions regarding inductive reasoning build on Descartes’ feature 
observations and Hume’s impressions and ideas by demonstrating how we can 
formulate knowledge even without direct experience. Synthetic a priori judgments do 
not require lived experience to be proven rationally true. Thus properties not distinctly 
entailed in concepts (as is the case with analytical concepts) can yield logical 
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conclusions without a posteriori experience. This relates to linguistic profiling and the 
expectation that members of speech communities will produce features that they may or 
may not truly produce. It is not unreasonable to believe that a speaker born and raised in 
the state of Georgia would likely speak with a Southern drawl, even if one has never 
directly encountered a speaker from Georgia. Inductive reasoning leads to logical 
assumptions about categories (and thus communities and their members) which 
influence the processing of knowledge and events in social life. 
 What follows from these abstract theories of knowledge with regard to 
cognition? Descartes’ conceptions of units, sets of units, and their relationships provides 
a structural framework for categorizing things and events. Through his reasoning, the 
arbitrary nature of groupings, as conducted by the mind (the faculty of judgment), is 
contextually dependent on the spatiotemporal progression of events. His piece of wax 
shows how a concept (wax) can remain unified despite its mutable characteristics (how 
it changes in heat). This illustrates how, in Hume’s terms, the idea of wax (as a concept) 
remains in the mind and the memory while undergoing distinct alterations in impression 
(sensory and perceptual experience). The expectation that wax will retain its physical 
properties at a stable temperature and that those properties will change under variable 
temperature is generalized as a “matter of fact,” therein establishing a shared folk theory 
of cause and effect: When room temperature wax is exposed to heat, it will melt. This is 
a synthetic a posteriori judgment; without repeated, lived experience observing that wax 
melts, there is no basis for positing that that effect will be obtained. Kant’s discussion of 
synthetic a priori arguments overturns Hume’s folk conception, noting that regular, 
31 
 
systematic behavior in the physical world establishes “relations of ideas” (in Hume’s 
terms) as scientific fact (or pure reason).  
 This model of cognition yields inductive reasoning, the process through which 
we reach conclusions about unknown things and events through previous experience. I 
suggest that the result of induction combined with the presumption of cause-and-effect 
relationships creates a liminal conceptual space wherein we challenge, reinforce, or 
modify our category and item descriptions based on experiences with them. By 
augmenting ideal concepts, we imbue them (truthfully or not) with features that then 
become associated with items and categories. Note that “experience” in this sense does 
not necessitate exposure; through the process of socialization, we become predisposed 
to normative behaviors, categories, and affective judgments. Socialization, be it 
conscious or not on the part of the socialized, is experienced as an impression from 
which ideas are either actively formed or passively received. The value judgments of 
ideas are necessarily conveyed through communication. 
 Examining how we process thoughts and acquire real or supposed knowledge 
provides the structure through which we can understand framing and the process 
through which we can generate frames. Cognitive scientist Zoltán Kövecses defines 
frames as “structured mental representations of an area of human experience (i.e., 
objects or events). As such, they amount to representations of prototypes. […] Frames 
have roles that can be instantiated by particular values” (Kövecses 2006:369). Frames 
are thus refined or subjective ideas in Hume’s terms, though Hume considered his 
viewpoint objective and was not concerned with social context or affect regarding the 
processing and transmission of ideas. As Kövecses notes, frames are representative of 
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category prototypes—we generate frames through experience with an individual object 
or event that serves as the basis for impression for their categories—and have a direct 
association with value judgments dependent on situational context. The cognitive, 
perceptual approach to understanding meaning demands that context and perspective 
mediate signification in social exchange. This is especially significant in language 
research as marked features are clearly contingent on time, place, and situation. 
Language variation necessarily involves contrast; variation can only occur when 
multiple expressive forms are possible.  
 The phenomenological aspect of framing requires attention to the divide 
between the real and the perceived. It would seem logical that frames derived from 
lived experience would relate to the things or events experienced, but upon closer 
scrutiny, this turns out to be false. To explore this distinction, we turn to Edmund 
Husserl (1859-1938), today considered the founder of phenomenology. Husserl labels 
the perception of a target object “noema” from the Greek word “nous” (νοῦς), or mind, 
in distinction against the object itself as it exists. Ironically, his definition is itself rather 
convoluted, though he illustrates the concept with this example: 
Let us suppose that in a garden we regard with pleasure a blossoming apple tree, 
the freshly green grass of the lawn, etc. It is obvious that the perception and the 
accompanying liking are not, at the same time, what is perceived and what is 
liked. In the natural attitude, the apple tree is for us something existing in the 
transcendent realm of spatial actuality, and the perception, as well as the liking, 
is for us a psychical state belonging to real people. Between the one and the 
other real things, between the real person or the real perception, and the real 
apple tree, there exist real relations. In such situations characterizing mental 
processes, it may be in certain cases that such perception is ‘mere hallucination,’ 
the perceived, this apple tree before us, does not exist in ‘actual’ reality. Now 
the real relation, previously meant as actually existing, is destroyed. Only the 
perception remains, but there is nothing actually there to which it is related.” 
(Husserl 1983:216-7) 
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What Husserl intends to convey in this passage is that the objects of our perceptions, as 
they exist in the world, do not entail the features and associated connotations (the noetic 
content) we assign them by means of our experiential perception. These features are 
elements of the psychical state aroused in the mind of the perceiver, and thus attributed 
to the real object by means of experiential impression, which leads to frame generation. 
The resultant frames, resident to the mental domain of the perceiver, are derived from 
the ideal response to actual impressions, and consequently instantiated with affective 
value judgments. 
 Husserl overlooks an important distinction arises between types of frames, 
however. Erving Goffman terms these two branches natural and social. For Goffman, 
“Natural frameworks identify occurrences seen as undirected, unoriented, unanimated, 
unguided, ‘purely physical’,” (Goffman 1974:22) or those free from the interference of 
the willful agency of sentient beings. These include physical sciences, mathematics, and 
unmediated sensory exposure to nature. He defines the counterpart to natural frames: 
Social frameworks, on the other hand, provide background understanding for 
events that incorporate the will, aim, and controlling effort of an intelligence, a 
live agency, the chief one being the human being. Such an agency is anything 
but implacable; it can be coaxed, flattered, affronted, and threatened. What it 
does can be described as ‘guided doings.’ These doings subject the doer to 
‘standards,’ to social appraisal of his action based on its honesty, efficiency, 
economy, safety, elegance, tactfulness, good taste, and so forth. (Goffman 
1974:22) 
Goffman holds that social frameworks are not those immutable truths of analytic nature, 
but those concepts of behaviors, predispositions, and judgments derived from affective 
relationships between humans and other things—especially other humans. He asserts 
that multiple frameworks can arise simultaneously in response to an event, and that 
those frameworks may operate in conjunction with or in opposition to each other. 
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Beyond the generation and mediation of frames, Goffman describes the manipulation of 
frames to enhance communicative competence, convey motive and emotion, and 
reinforce socially normative behaviors and perspectives. 
 While the rationalist perspective embraced by Descartes privileges the certainty 
of the mind, that certainty serves to quantify the extended world and the reality it 
contains. The importance of Descartes’ views for my argument reside in the mental 
determinations of categories, features, and properties of objects and persons we 
encounter in lived experience. His empiricist successors, including Hume and Kant, 
further Descartes’ categorical and taxonomical views by exploring how the faculty of 
judgment operates through lived experience and analysis. Descartes describes the 
various features of the piece of wax, assuming the socially ascribed nomenclature with 
which it is labeled and recognized; Hume examines the nature of how we reason those 
mental conclusions (ideas) based on physical interaction (impressions) with the object 
itself to reach a meaningful conception of the category and its primary features. Kant, 
though in some disagreement with Hume’s conclusions about the nature of knowledge, 
reveals how concepts taken as complete (analytic) are mediated through experience (a 
posteriori).  
 I argue that to advance Kant’s conclusions, we must account for shifts in 
conceptualization over time. Thus an analytic concept imbued with distinct features 
serves as a basic idea, yet lived experience through impressions can yield a modification 
of that analytic; if the experience is sufficient to warrant a contestation of the analytic 
category through synthetic means, the category or class in contest will take on new 
characteristics derived from the force of a posteriori reflection.  
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 Building on this, Husserl draws a divide between the reality of an object and the 
impressions we individually receive from them, demonstrating a distance between 
objective truth (which he holds cannot be obtained) and perceived truth. Thus the social 
import of Husserl’s view is that perceived reality, whether or not perceived truthfully, 
constitutes the conceptualization of analytic and synthetic observation. Goffman’s 
frames combine all of these experiential responses as the cognitive templates that 
inform our recognition of things and events, which in turn prescribe a perspective and 
prospective course of action for negotiating experience. I argue that through these 
means we process received information and lived experience to conceptualize things 
and events. When these conceptualizations are socialized through communication, they 
become social matters of fact that enter the culture and made normative. This view 
accounts for both community/collective endorsement and idiosyncratic interpretation, 
demonstrating how seemingly prevalent views can become socially sound while they 
are subject to change over time.  
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Chapter 4: The Intellectual Roots of Language as Perception 
 In this section I analyze how documentary linguistic research of the early 20th 
century derived social meaning from language variation given a context observed but 
not native to the researcher. The establishment of speech alternation in both perception 
and referentiality demonstrate how variance in language usage reflects variance in 
social categories. The intentional and systematic distribution of appropriateness for non-
standard speech forms reveals how categorical stratification is both socialized through 
linguistic practice and applied with ingrained affective judgments. I refer to several case 
studies that show how a socially significant taxonomy of both speech and speakers is 
evident in deviation from the presumed standard. In this way, the established collective 
meanings constructed from the processes of cognition are imputed through interaction 
in the medium of speech production, institutionalizing the ascribed differences between 
persons and classes via observation. 
 Performative variation in written language mirrors variation in spoken language. 
The cases presented in this section clearly demonstrate not only how perception 
mediates received meaning, but also how variation is intentionally employed in spoken 
language to create meaning. Speakers can and do actively augment speech to perform 
social signification in discourse. This shows how intentionally modified language 
directly indexes socially pertinent categories, including speech communities. This 
signification extends recursively to real or perceived members of the indexed 
communities, and thus the use of marked features operationalizes the referential force of 
variant speech forms. 
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 Franz Boas’ “On Alternating Sounds” (1889) investigates the breadth of 
phonemic distinction in language, but approaches the concept through what he calls 
“sound-blindness.” The name, derived from the ocular phenomenon of color-blindness, 
implies an inability for the hearer to distinguish between different phones (sound units). 
Boas notes that this obfuscation arises with unfamiliar terms, whether they are 
unlearned elements of one’s native language or elements of a foreign language. A brief 
discussion of research in children’s audio perception reinforces the possibility for even 
simple terms to be misunderstood by young learners with limited lexicons; Boas does 
not speculate heavily in this article about how these experiences with novel lexical 
items configures the interpretation of phonemic distinction in the mind. Of greater 
significance is his turn toward indigenous language documentation, wherein he reveals 
difficulty in systematizing and designating phonetic and phonological constellations in 
languages foreign to that of the documenter. Drawn from his own fieldworks, Boas 
recognizes the inconsistency of transcribing words in the same manner while 
establishing a preliminary translation. He provides a list of several “Eskimo” words 
which he recorded as distinctly different between tokens, explaining that despite clearly 
recognizing the terms to be equivalent, the transcriptions vary from one to the next due 
to the uncertainty of their character in the ears of the recorder. He notes: 
It is found that the vocabularies of collectors, although they may apply 
diacritical marks or special alphabets, bear evidence of the phonetics of their 
own languages. This can be explained only by the fact that each apperceives the 
unknown sounds by the means of the sounds of his own language. (Boas 
1889:51) 
Thus, Boas (whose college education revolved around physics and perception, including 
psycho-acoustics) attributes phonetic distinctions not only to the peculiarities of the 
contexts in which they arise, but also through the filter of the documenter’s native 
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repertoire. He further explains that alternating sounds ought not exist; when they do 
occur it is due to the misperception of the hearer as opposed to the supposed “free 
variation” of the unfamiliar ear, which he asserts adequate training can neutralize.  
 On one hand, Boas’ analysis rests on the presumption of a solid, differentiated 
phonemic inventory—a clear taxonomy of phonemes and their allophones. Though the 
term never arises in this work, it is clear that allophonic variation is central to this 
phenomenon. For example, the alveolar flap [ɾ] is an allophone of both the voiced and 
unvoiced alveolar plosives [d] and [t] respectively. The words “bitter” and “bidder” are 
minimal pairs in that they differ only in voicing of the central consonant, yet while the 
former is understood to be pronounced [bɪtr̩] and the latter [bɪdr̩], they are both capable 
of being correctly pronounced with the shared allophone, [bɪɾr̩]. To this extent, the two 
words are homophones, especially if Betty bought a bit of butter for the batter at an 
auction—making her the better bidder. Perhaps even more so if she lost the auction with 
any degree of envy or frustration, making her a bitter bidder. That fluency of speech and 
accommodation in hearing permit us to recognize the quickened flap [ɾ] as a substitute 
for either [d] or [t] denotes the flap as an allophone.  
 If allophones arise without systematic environmental constraints, linguists of the 
20th century would label the alternation as “free variation,” meaning the substitution is 
recognized and endorsed as grammatical without discrete phonological rules. In recent 
decades, the concept of “free variation” has become controversial to the point of being 
disavowed entirely; an orderly, empirical discipline must account for variation in some 
way. This is at times handled as a dialect difference or attributed to a speech community 
by means of some social variable such as class, race, or gender. Traditionally, 
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allophonic variation involves accepted substitution when the divergence is minimal. 
Take for instance the English words “pen” and “pin.” The vocalic difference between 
these minimal pairs is orthographically clear, yet regional dialects like the Southern 
accent in American English make no phonological distinction: both can be pronounced 
[pɪn]. The referent (and indeed grammatical category) are clarified by the utterance and 
situational context. 
 Examples of alternating, but not allophonic sounds discussed in Chapter 6 of 
this thesis, taken from the poetry of Paul Laurence Dunbar, include the perceived 
equivalence of “dat” and “that” as well as “mouf” and “mouth.” That “dat” [dæt] is not 
lexically recognized as its own item, but can be recognized as an allophonic 
mispronunciation of “that” [ðæt] does not impede the hearer’s ability to interpret the 
speech. However, this marked variation coincides with social assignation of speaker 
identity and affective evaluations of the speaker. Thus, communicative competence is 
not impeded as the hearer can accommodate the speaker’s meaning despite the 
mispronunciation, yet the utterance retains a distinct character that may or may not 
provoke a social judgment of the speaker. In Dunbar’s works, the difference indicated 
that the poem’s persona was racially marked as African American, as suggested by the 
speaker’s reference to himself as the little brown baby’s “pappy.” In the 21st century, 
the use of [dæt] may not specifically indicate race, but perhaps an urban identity, an 
intentionally stylized production, or an unintentional pronunciation stemming from lack 
of education. I’m suggesting that multiple connotations can and do exist, the extent and 
evaluation of which are determined by the perception of the hearer regardless of the 
speaker’s status, situation, or intent. 
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 Edward Sapir discusses the implied assignation of social judgments through 
speech in his 1915 article “Abnormal Types of Speech in Nootka.” Though he distinctly 
analyzes the use of direct conversational speech, his assertions regarding the social 
contract that recognizes aberrant speech forms as playful, yet ideologically accepted 
derogation inform parallel interpretations in recorded utterance, both spoken and 
written. Sapir’s work with indigenous languages of North America involve 
phonological and morphosyntactic structures that designate grammatical variation 
through conversational deixis; the context of who said what in what way to whom is 
necessary to interpret and distinguish variations in speech forms. In a broad context, he 
asserts that the decoration of speech through stylistic means accords with perceived 
characteristics of the addressee (in interlocution) or persona (in narrative). His examples 
detail observable physical traits, perceived mental character, and traditional 
mythological figures as targets for ascribed “abnormal” speech patterns. Sapir writes: 
An interesting linguistic and cultural problem is the use in speech of various 
devices implying something in regard to the status, sex, age, or other 
characteristics of the speaker, person addressed, or person spoken of, without 
any direct statement as to such characteristics. […] A more specialized type of 
these person-implications is comprised by all cases in which the reference is 
brought about not by the use of special words or locutions, that is, by lexical, 
stylistic, or syntactic means, but by the employment of special grammatical 
elements, consonant or vocalic changes, or addition of meaningless sounds, that 
is, by morphologic or phonetic means. (Sapir 1985:179) 
Sapir holds that the presentation of speech, as opposed to its direct content, creates a 
socially-endorsed view of the target, whether that target is the speaker, the addressee, or 
a third party.  
 In the case of direct conversation, Sapir notes how physical characteristics of the 
addressee can influence the speaker’s choice of presentation. The majority of field data 
included comes from ethnographic study of the Nootka Indians of the Alberni canal 
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area of Vancouver Island, British Columbia, Canada. Sapir lists many disparate targeted 
traits in addressees that can warrant augmented speech. Gender restrictions and 
diminutives are not uncommon for prescriptive speech practices in cultures the world 
over; taboos regarding what topics and grammatical forms can be used between sexes, 
kin relations, and adult/children interlocutors are often to be found in linguistic 
ethnography. However, Sapir’s discoveries a century ago seem both incendiary and 
downright odd by today’s paradigms: “The physical classes indicated by these methods 
are children, unusually fat or heavy people, unusually short adults, those suffering from 
some defect of the eye, hunchbacks, those that are lame, left-handed persons, and 
circumcised males” (Sapir 1985:181). He posits that suffixation and “consonantal play” 
attribute irregularity to the addressee when utilized by the speaker to mark the 
addressee’s character. Beyond the morphological and phonetic alterations themselves, 
Sapir discusses the etiquette involved with these usages. When showing affection to a 
friend or family member displaying the trait, such as a wizened grandparent, these 
forms are endorsed and accepted. However, when addressing or referring to an adult of 
the same social status, use of these forms “might be intended to convey contempt when 
addressed to a young man, and would be promptly resented as an insult” (Sapir 
1985:184). He continues to note that these qualities appear to do with inherent 
conditions (aside from circumcision); in the case of blindness, Sapir notes that it is most 
commonly acquired later in life (as opposed to congenitally) and is considered “too 
grave an affliction to be treated light-heartedly” with these forms of “speech-mockery” 
(Sapir 1985:185).  
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  Sapir’s discussion of speech-mockery does not end in direct conversational 
discourse. Moving from the domain of interlocution to performance-event discourse, 
Sapir posits how similar forms of morphological and consonantal variation are 
employed in mythological narrative. His transition from conversation analysis to 
performance events, while lengthy, draws attention to attitudes about language use. 
This matter of consonantal play to express modalities of attitude is doubtless a 
fruitful field for investigation in American linguistics and should receive more 
attention than has hitherto been accorded it. It may be expected to turn up 
particularly in connexion [sic] with notions of smallness, largeness, contempt, 
affection, respect, and sex-differences. 
 Such consonantal changes and increments as have been considered are 
evidently of a rhetorical or stylistic as much as of a purely grammatical sort. 
This is borne out by the fact that quite analogous processes are found employed 
as literary devices in American myths and songs. I have already drawn attention 
to the fact, that in American mythology certain beings are apt to be definitely 
characterized by speech peculiarities. The employment of consonantal play or of 
similar devices in such cases seems always to have a decidedly humorous effect. 
(Sapir 1985:186) 
Having established the existence of normative patterns of speech that deviate from 
grammatical standards when used in discourse with or about certain social categories, 
Sapir delineates the bases for these systematic deviations. His exploration of 
conversational speech forms includes categories borne of spatial proportion (the 
unusually large- or small-bodied), of physical maturity (the young and the elderly), 
those with impaired faculties (the sight-challenged and the “lame” (Sapir 1985:183)), 
and also “classes of individuals characterized by some mental quality,” (Sapir 
1985:184) explicitly citing examples for greed and cowardice. He also mentions a 
pertinent distinction in forms of speech for the left-handed. All of these usages are 
bound by some evaluative judgment, the most common of which is comedic effect, 
though Sapir notes the importance of deictic analysis in interpretation. Whether or not 
the employment of a deviant speech form will be considered a social affront depends on 
43 
 
the relationship between the speaker and the referent, determined in conversational 
situation and context. Affection, contempt, and respect are determined by not only the 
use of speech forms, but also by the reception of that use, as is posited by the capacity 
for insult when deviant speech forms are employed for a non-prototypical member of 
the referent category. 
 Beyond the conversational level, Sapir reinforces the equation of non-standard 
speech forms with referent groups in narrative. The examples listed primarily tend to 
animal types, including the deer and mink in Nootka, the mink in Kwakiutl, and the 
mantis and baboon in African tales. Sapir does not comment on the prevalence of 
animal characters as representative protagonists on North American mythologies, but 
does link them to archetypal roles given their engagements in narrative. He notes 
similarities between the mink and the mantis as prototype trickster figures across 
continents for their narrative characters and establishes links between deviant speech 
forms that are repeatedly attributed to characters. Furthermore, he points to the 
linguistic othering of foreign speech phones and patterns in narrative and song recitation 
as well as the similarities between deviant speech forms attributed to classes of extant 
individuals and myth figures: 
The Nootka mocking-forms, with their use of the diminutive affix and of 
consonant play, represent a combination, both linguistically and 
psychologically, of the pity and affection symbolized by the use of the 
diminutive element and of the contempt or jesting attitude implied by the 
imitation of the speech defect. A myth character whom it is desired to treat 
humorously may, among other possibilities, be relegated either to the class of 
poor talkers or to that of nature’s step-children. Hence the consonant play of 
such characters is in part traceable either to speech defects or to mocking-forms. 
(Sapir 1985:191) 
The oblique references Sapir makes towards disciplinary divisions in the transitional 
passage are of great interest. Why should these representational qualities be relegated to 
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mere rhetorical or stylistic literary devices when they display grammatical deviation 
from standardized speech forms? Sapir does not tackle the issue of whether or not these 
spoken trends arise in written narrative discourse; the domain of writing is not explicitly 
mentioned in this examination at all. Yet the association of a character (or character 
type) with non-standard speech entails a relationship of identity in which that character 
is perceived as a distinct other. This distinction is empirically observed through 
linguistic means; the character’s language overtly identifies the character as a member 
of a socially endorsed category. Evaluative judgments about category members are 
deictically bound and more fully informed by the context of the performance event. As 
such, one cannot assert that any specific kind of affective judgment will be universally 
applied to x-type characters or categories due to y-type speech forms, but I would argue 
that some affective judgment is certain, even if the quality of that judgment can only be 
determined given the context of a specific instance. 
 The notion of a standardized grammar with generally average speech forms is at 
the heart of Sapir’s exploration. Even with socially-ascribed nonsensical variation in the 
form of consonantal play, established alternations appear to have corresponding 
connotations. This is in accord with Boas’ treatment of alternating sounds, as well as 
with a theory of standardization in itself. While alternations exist in abnormal forms of 
Nootka, they are not without engrained meaning. Each of the alternating affixes and 
consonant variants yields a recognizable purpose that is socialized among speakers 
through social norms, mores, and representational narrative. That such behavior in 
utterance is commonly understood to entail emotional nuance and especially when the 
deictic constraints of interactions further inform acceptability of employing non-
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standard forms suggests that affective semantic content is bound to any non-standard 
utterance in discourse. I do not see this as indicative of polarity or amplitude with 
regard to affect, but rather that the use of non-standard forms opens a door for 
perceptual judgment. This judgment takes place in the reception of the utterance; it is 
the addressee, and not the speaker, who determines the degree of markedness and its 
significance in linguistic exchange.  
 This addressee-oriented approach to discourse interpretation is itself non-
standard as it locates agency in the discourse patient. Discourse analysis frequently 
centers on the speaker as the agent; in a conversational exchange, one interlocutor 
initiates and another responds, each alternating as the agent with her utterance to the 
addressee. This is not how we experience conversations as individuals in lived 
experience. While we may attend to those who speak to us with varying degrees of self-
restraint, we cannot remove ourselves from passive synchronic response to stimulus. 
Even as observers removed from the exchange, we respond to the flow of the exchange 
and its mise en scene both as it unfolds in experienced time and later through 
recollection of the focal points. Furthermore, the concept of standardized language is 
bound by lived experience. What is and is not standard in speech forms, even for native 
speakers, is bound by dialect and accent. Successful communicative interaction 
demands some degree of mutual intelligibility, but distinctions are omnipresent from 
one speaker to the next, even if only in pitch, rate of speech, and other aspects of 
production. In an extreme view of speech variation, this can be attributed to the non-
existence of dialect; those who subscribe to this belief maintain that what we refer to as 
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dialect in a speech community is actually just a strong tendency towards similar idiolect 
features (speech forms distinct to individuals).  
 Herein lies a category distinction that disavows the existence of speech 
communities. If we consider a speech community a set of elements that share some 
common feature (or series of features), the extreme view recognizes the individual 
elements but not the set of individuals. While technically true of all persons given 
distinctions in physical situation, genetic and bodily composition, socialization, etc., 
this is neither productive for analysis nor aligned with categorical frame generation in 
cognition. Even with inanimate, mass-produced objects, there is little benefit in 
distinguishing between similar elements without some purpose external to the object. 
For example, the flatware in one’s kitchen includes various forks, knives, spoons, and 
other utensils. The distinction between teaspoons and tablespoons is clear even though 
they are all spoons; yet only when serving tea or soup does one pay attention to which 
spoon is “hers” to use at the table as opposed to her guest’s. This example also serves as 
an analogy for degree of specificity. While the umbrella term “spoon” may include 
numerous spoons of varying shapes, sizes, volumes, materials, and appearances, I do 
not often need to specify a certain subset category of spoon without a specific purpose. 
In essence, category groupings and the necessary degree of specificity for conveying a 
proposition or completing a task are subject to the Gricean maxims with the goal of 
communicative competence. 
 Beyond category distinctions and degree of specificity, an addressee-oriented 
perspective also calls into question the success of communicative competence regarding 
the content of an utterance. Discourse exchanges assume some degree of focus shared 
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by interlocutors. In a perfect scenario, all participants would be attentive to the 
exchange, be free of sensory impediments and distractions, and share grammatical 
understanding such that they comprehend each other’s conveyances clearly. This is 
Noam Chomsky’s ideal speaker-listener theory of linguistic competence (Chomsky 
1965). This theory contrasts with approaches to discourse that center on linguistic 
performance (taken here to mean production as opposed to stylized presentation). 
William Labov argues against the vacuum of Chomsky’s proposed system of 
competence, accounting for contextual elements in the situation of the exchange that 
influence how interlocutors perceive and attend to it: 
It is now evident to many linguists that the primary purpose of the distinction 
[between performance and competence] has been to help the linguist exclude 
data which he finds inconvenient to handle. [...] If performance involves 
limitations of memory, attention, and articulation, then we must consider the 
entire English grammar to be a matter of performance. (Labov 1971:468) 
Labov argues that it is necessary to include the site and context of an exchange in the 
interpretation of its content, as well as factors that influence the transmission of 
linguistic exchange, especially in field elicitation. Perhaps the most critical element of 
Labov’s methodology is attention to speech, or the degree that a speaker modifies their 
“natural” speech. Yet Labov’s explorations maintain the speaker-oriented perspective, 
relegating the addressee to a position of passive reception beyond the happenstance of 
her person and the details of the setting’s exchange. He centers the heuristics of 
conveyance in what the speaker implies without regard to how that conveyance is 
received and inferred by the addressee. 
 Sapir alludes to the likelihood of addressee inference with regard to non-
standard forms, but only insofar as to note that when abnormal speech forms are 
employed at the expense and justification of the referent’s or addressee’s character or 
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corpus that those forms could have injurious or insulting consequences. He notes that in 
Nootkan exchanges about or with persons who demonstrate non-standard physical or 
character traits the speaker is warranted to use non-standard forms of speech, but that 
warrant is determined by the deictic relationship between the speaker and addressee. 
That a social affront is possible without a predetermined consent indicates that non-
standard speech forms entail categorical distinctions understood by the community—
that the addressee, referent, and overhearers will recognize the affective content of the 
altered form. Sapir inherently endorses that the speech community will infer such non-
standard forms, regardless of whether or not the speaker intends and affective 
implication. This assumes that when the speaker performs a non-standard speech form, 
she does so voluntarily with the intent to imply that form’s affective social convention. 
While Sapir investigates several potential origins for abnormal speech forms stemming 
from speech impediments (“defects” and “mutilations” in his terms), he does not 
comment on how those who naturally perform these abnormal speech types reflect on 
the treatment of speech mockery—merely that they are imitated on account of perceived 
differences.  
 Sapir extends this mockery outside the speech community level, noting that 
forms of mockery exhibit similarities to the situations in which speakers of foreign 
languages or alternate dialects are represented and performed, both within the 
community as well as in exchanges between communities: 
The Nootka Indians of one tribe frequently imitate the real or supposed speech 
peculiarities of those belonging to other Nootka tribes, the stress primarily laid 
not so much on peculiarities of vocabulary and grammatical form as on general 
traits of intonation or sound articulation (cf. our New England ‘nasal twang’ and 
Southern ‘drawl’). (Sapir 1985:193) 
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In this passage, Sapir also notes that his arguments in this paper assume that the dialect 
of the tribes “of Barkley sound and the head of Alberni canal may be taken as the 
normal form of Nootka speech; this, of course, is purely arbitrary, but so would any 
other point of departure be” (Sapir 1985:193). While standardized or normal forms 
provide the basis for distinction against the abnormal forms he investigates, such is the 
privilege of documenting understudied languages: There is no overtly recognized 
standard form without grounding the analysis with a vantage point designated by a 
single dialect. Thus Sapir’s investigation is free from the hegemonic constraints that 
would be inherent in national- or global-level languages like English. Despite the 
existence of many forms of differentiated English the world over, we perceive (in part, 
because of umbrella category labels) that all speakers of English employ the same 
grammatical and phonemic means. This could not be farther from the truth, as is clear to 
any speaker of any substrate of English who has encountered a dialect unfamiliar to her 
own experience. This occurs on a large scale at the international level—for instance, as 
in American English versus British English—and on much smaller scales at the 
intraregional level—for instance, as in east-central Pennsylvania, at the intersection of 
four distinct regional dialect areas, based on a 2005 telephone survey (Wolfram & 
Schilling-Estes 2005:131). 
 Sapir’s connection between non-standard speech forms and affective judgments 
against those who either truly speak them or are perceived to speak them is limited to 
oral data obtained in ethnographic study. Given that speech performance is empirical 
insofar as it is produced by a speaker, how would his assertions regarding socialized 
judgment of non-standard speakers apply to written utterance? He has established that 
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within a community, performative trends indicate an extant class of persons to whom 
those trends are attributed, specifying that production of the exact linguistic features 
need not obtain to warrant the endorsed association. Sapir has taken an observable 
linguistic phenomenon (a non-standard form) and connected it to a subset of a speech 
community (the members of the sub-community who produce or are supposed to 
produce that form). That the association between real persons and assumed features is 
socialized through both conversational and narrative means indicates the ideological 
stratification imposed upon the marked-form producers, even if they do not physically 
produce those marked features. It is not inconceivable that the intentional use of non-
standard forms in other media of linguistic transmission (i.e., writing) would imply the 
same socially recognized distinction against a category of persons. 
 If Sapir’s argument were limited only to extant individuals with irregular 
speech, it would not provide such systematic and intercultural similarities as 
demonstrated by the variety of languages and communities he compares. That these 
regular similarities do occur across cultures and languages suggests that these 
associations are native to cognition and categorization as opposed to mere facets of a 
single community’s social outlook. Instead, Sapir demonstrates that othering on the 
basis of non-standard speech forms, regardless of the content of the utterance, is 
determined by the presented form of linguistic conveyance. The patterns of non-
standard usage signify and index sub-classes of speakers in such a manner that the 
affective implication of the form of utterance is attributed to both real and imaginary 
members of those sub-classes. Yet this does not necessitate that members of those sub-
classes produce and perform those linguistic features; it only necessitates that the 
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association between feature and sub-class member be socially recognizable. Why then 
would the use of that feature in written discourse be any less sufficient to connote the 
social implication? Non-standard forms in writing are not audibly noticeable as accents 
and speech impediments are, but are just as clearly marked in the eyes of a literate 
reader, even if the mode of sensory observation has shifted from the audio to the visual. 
Moreover, attention to non-standard forms of writing bears a greater degree of 
markedness given that the faculty of reading is an active pursuit; one does not have to 
pay attention to hear and interpret even a non-standard form of their native language. 
Literacy requires the active participation of the reader, who becomes the addressee of 
the text. Perhaps it is literacy itself that has created such an emphasis on standardization 
in languages that supersede a local distribution. 
 The selection and implementation of orthography in indigenous language 
revitalization begins in many cases with the question of whether or not oral languages 
should be written at all. Descriptive linguists like Boas and Sapir used systematized 
graphic representations to record oral sounds in written form, but did not actively 
engender orthographies in the communities they studied. Colonial efforts to instantiate 
written forms of language in indigenous communities frequently arose from the impetus 
of governmental or religious proselytizing in the 19th century and later turned towards 
conversion to the colonial language and its practices. Attention to language 
revitalization in the past 25 years has prompted renewed vigor for spoken language 
transmission with intergenerational mother-tongue transfer in the home, but has been 
less successful in recognizing the value of written language forms beyond their 
pedagogical utility. Written representations in learning spaces more frequently serve to 
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reinforce pronunciation and vocabulary-building exercises than as legitimate forms of 
expression in their own rights. In some cases, such as with the Cherokee syllabary, a 
single writing system exists and empowers language users; the Osage nation’s 
communally-constructed writing system was created with the motto “Orthography is 
Sovereignty.” In other cases, a multitude of orthographic systems have been attempted 
in complementary spatial and temporal distribution, leading to several distinct 
orthographies taught and used in different places and times.  
 Neely and Palmer (2009) explore the phenomenon of heterographia in the 
Kiowa language. They define heterographia as “a situation in which one language is 
approached via multiple writing systems” (Neely and Palmer 2009:272), citing several 
diachronic and synchronic iterations of orthographic representation of Kiowa. Neely 
and Palmer discuss the origins of several systems, including among others John 
Harrington’s approach from the 1920s, to the Summer Institute of Linguistics’ Christian 
missionary scripts, and the Parker McKenzie and Alecia Gonzales methods, 
independently developed by Kiowa citizens. Neely and Palmer direct significant 
attention to the domains in which Kiowa is spoken, the intellectual property of what is 
spoken in the language, accessibility and authority to partake and perform traditional 
content, and the use of orthography as a means of preserving and teaching culture. They 
contrast Kiowa instruction to that of Cherokee, Creek, and Choctaw at the University of 
Oklahoma, noting that tribally-endorsed standardization in the latter three languages 
relieves instructors of challenges faced by their Kiowa counterparts. For the purpose of 
language teaching, they hold that “Native American language instructors at the 
University of Oklahoma support standardization of writing method or orthography, as it 
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has been their experience that without literacy use, second language instruction is nil” 
(Neely and Palmer 2009:275). This is in part derived from the structure of university 
academics which aim for maximum transfer of literacy skills from the language of 
instruction to the target language. This constraint does not apply in religious or 
ceremonial domains, where emphasis on adherence to traditional practices trumps the 
goals of instruction in favor of cultural maintenance. Neely and Palmer explore Kiowa 
citizens’ views of language as symbolic capital, both as an essentializing factor in the 
construction of tribal identity and authority as well as whether or not it is culturally 
appropriate or prudent to write the language at all. They explain: 
A standard orthography is not just a practical representation of a language but 
also an intrinsically political manifestation of group relations. The emphasis in 
recent decades on the importance of Native American languages as symbolic 
tools and badges of identity that encode and embody important cultural 
information has the potential for both empowerment and disenfranchisement. 
(Neely and Palmer 2009:286) 
Whether or not the medium of language (oral, written, etc.) permits or amplifies the 
association between perceived forms of speech and the speakers presumed to bear them, 
Sapir shows that social evaluations transpire on account of non-standard usage. Neely 
and Palmer provide a contrasting example of heterographia with the Kiowa language. 
Because it has no standardized written form, variation in writing is free from marked 
constraints the way that national level languages like English are. Neely and Palmer 
note that variation in written form emphasizes communicative competence, especially 
in the domain of pedagogy. The form of written utterance signifies the word and its 
relative concept in usage, not a prescriptively defined orthographic convention. This 
phenomenon is cognitive; it assigns a value judgment to a class of persons and binds 
that value judgment to the concept of the class. Sapir notes that this happens on both the 
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grammatical and the aesthetic levels, i.e. that stylistic representation as a narrative or 
performative device does in fact engender a socialized belief that the referent class 
displays those marked attributes, even if that belief is patently false. This is the very 
essence of iconization, fractal recursivity, and erasure. 
 Judith Irvine and Susan Gal (2000) describe iconization, fractal recursivity, and 
erasure as three semiotic processes through which ideologies are formed, noting that 
“[these processes] concern the way people conceive of links between linguistic forms 
and social phenomena” (Irvine and Gal 2000:37). Iconization, by their definition, 
involves the attribution of one or more distinct social features of a specific community 
as an essential element to that community’s identity, which then serves as indexical of 
that community in a reduced conceptualization. Through simplification, that contingent 
feature becomes affixed to the image of the community as a seemingly necessary 
characteristic, despite the complexity of social practices displayed by the community 
and the contexts in which that feature arises. Having been “iconized,” the association 
between the presumed necessary feature and its productive community is not only 
socially endorsed, but transposed via fractal recursivity. This process involves the 
projection of a distinction, salient within one domain, to another domain in which that 
salience is assumed but not necessarily warranted. Irvine and Gal posit that “the 
dichomotizing and partitioning process that was involved in some understood 
opposition (between groups or linguistic varieties, for example) recurs at other levels, 
creating either subcategories at either side of a contrast or supercategories that include 
both sides but oppose them to something else” (Irvine and Gal 2000:38). Fractal 
recursivity thus yields supposedly rational ideas about classification and categorization; 
55 
 
in essence, it modifies the conceptualization of a community or relationship via domain 
transfer, extending that feature as a metaphor representative of the iconized community 
and the behaviors of its members. Erasure, the third process, either overlooks or silences 
elements or features that contradict the iconized attribute. This solidifies a 
conceptualization, reinforcing the totalizing pertinence of the feature in question by 
neglecting, dismissing, or explaining away features in contrast to the holistic perception 
of the concept.  
 These processes follow the explication of philosophy as demonstrated in the 
previous chapter. Iconization deals with base observations about the features or 
behavior of a thing or event, much like Descartes’ piece of wax. The task of defining 
and categorizing the object of inquiry notes its salient features, privileging those which 
are seemingly unique to the item type and ubiquitous to elements of that class. 
Observation (as impression) yields iconized concepts (as idea), which then are applied 
as matters of fact in Hume’s terms via a seemingly necessary and pertinent projection of 
essentialism into other associated domains. Erasure solidifies those conclusions by 
reinforcing the elements in accord with the totalizing vision of the concept at the 
expense of silencing or overlooking the contrasting elements. Though not expressly 
Kant’s discussion of synthetic a posteriori reasoning, this reflects my interpretation of 
(re)generating analytic conceptualizations through experience.  
 Mikhail Bakhtin posits narrative as ideologically charged not for its content, but 
for its role in social interaction. His Marxist theoretical grounding dispels idealistic 
philosophy as centered in the individual or in the mind, locations of no social collective 
value. He claims: 
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The ideological environment is the realized, materialized, externally expressed 
social consciousness of a given collective. It is determined by the collective’s 
economic existence and, in turn, determines the individual consciousness of 
each member of the collective. In fact, the individual consciousness can only 
become a consciousness by being realized in the forms of the ideological 
environment proper to it: in language, in conventionalized gesture, in artistic 
image, in myth, and so on. (Bakhtin 1994:127) 
Bakhtin’s assessment locates constellations of communal belief structures outside of 
individuals, but does not account for how the collective consciousness is embraced, 
performed, or challenged by those members of the communities in question. To 
disavow the agency of individual community members who respond to collective 
stimulus neglects the affective and psychological humanity of those persons, relegating 
them to mere roles within a social mechanism. This cannot be the case. Bakhtin’s 
emphasis on configurations of interaction relies on individuals both in role and in 
person when analyzing sites of interaction. In his discussion of creative art, he claims: 
’The artistic’ in its total integrity is not located in the artifact and not located in 
the separately considered psyches of creator and contemplator; it encompasses 
all three of these factors. It is a special form of interrelationship between creator 
and contemplator fixed in a work of art. (Bakhtin 1994:161) 
In his analysis, Bakhtin finds significance not in the minds or actions of individuals as 
they engage in discourse actively or passively, but rather how the situational and 
cultural context of the engagement forms and is formed by a socially shared system of 
meaning adopted by all parties. He holds that subjective thoughts, feelings, and 
psychical acts are not the bases of the construction of meaning, but rather that “the 
individual and the subjective are backgrounded here by the social and the objective” 
(Bakhtin 1994:164). This moves the locus of significance from the signifier to the 
signified, elevating the ends of interaction above the participants and their means. 
Herein Bakhtin empowers social recognition over the individual who actively 
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recognizes socially established values. However, Bakhtin cannot fully erase the 
individual: 
Assumed value judgments are, therefore, not individual emotions but regular 
and essential social acts. Individual emotions can come into play only as 
overtones accompanying the basic tone of social evaluation. ‘I’ can realize itself 
verbally only on the basis of ‘we’. (Bakhtin 1994:164) 
This dialectic exchange places primacy on the collective yet relies on the individual to 
perform and conform to social functions. Thus an examination of how an individual 
perceives and engages with social discourse is required to fully authorize collective 
value judgments. Furthermore, Bakhtin’s analysis does not account for shifts in social 
evaluations over time; events and experiences that alter collective judgments must 
transpire first at the individual level before they can be adopted by communities at 
large. 
 It is clear that social configurations are revealed by linguistic utterance. I hold 
that these configurations are observable in variation in written utterance as well as 
spoken. This moves beyond the realm of whether or not speech communities exhibit 
variation; it deals with the meanings attributed to language use both in form and 
content. It is not sufficient to merely catalog the inventory of phones, lexical items, and 
syntactic arrangements that seem to comprise a language; while these elements are 
necessary to discover the significance of utterance, they are but material evidence that 
reveal the meanings of conveyance and communication. Furthermore, to posit meaning 
without situational context leaves a transliteration bereft of the connotative suggestion 
embedded within. While those connotations are unique to each speaker and addressee, 
they become systematized through exposure, repetition, and socialization throughout an 
individual’s lived experience. Socially endorsed frameworks, such as the abnormal 
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speech forms Sapir illustrates in Nootka, create meaning through perceived signification 
and attach that meaning to their conceptual referents. Although this transpires at an 
individual level, the practice of recognizing and performing this signification creates a 
shared conceptual association—a phenomenon entirely separate, but derived from 
linguistic practice. As Benjamin Whorf describes it: 
The investigator of culture should hold an ideal of linguistics as that of a 
heuristic approach to problems of psychology which hitherto he may have 
shrunk from considering—a glass through which, when correctly focused, will 
appear the true shapes of many of those forces which hitherto have been to him 
but the inscrutable blank of invisible and bodiless thought. (Whorf 1956:73) 
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Chapter 5: Accent Representation in Animated Media 
 In this section I address how phonocentrism (the primacy of spoken language 
over other forms of linguistic utterance) devalues the authenticity of written forms of 
language. I do so by questioning assumptions about focal aspects of speech as they 
pertain to non-vocal communication. The mainstay of my original analysis comes from 
audiovisual media, particularly animated media, in translation and subtitles. By 
discussing the representation of content through written form, I explore how written 
language breaks standardized norms to provide context inherent in spoken language per 
speech variation. This includes relationships between the speaker and listener (or in 
these cases, original audio and visual tracks and audiences), with emphasis on the 
necessary linguistic translation of spoken content to reflect non-spoken content for 
unintended audiences.  
 Several strands of theory are considered here in brief, which I hope to develop 
more fully in the future. They include the primary focus of dialect representation in 
written language, referential specificity for intended audiences (as with electronic 
media, the site of a performance event is more frequently transferred to individual 
exposure as opposed to physical gathering), cultural and ideological modeling in 
narrative, and polyglossia in the form of simultaneous dual-language transmission (one 
language spoken and one language written as with subtitles).  
 The selection of cases presented here follow Sapir’s discussion of performative 
speech variation in myth and song narrative and Bakhtin’s analysis of the ideological 
character of literature. Furthermore, the role of accent in animated Disney feature films 
has been extensively researched by linguist Rosina Lippi-Green (2012). Lippi-Green 
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strategically analyzed the spoken content of animated Disney feature films to show how 
accent is correlated with race, gender, and character in narrative. Her analysis notes that 
protagonists in Disney films almost exclusively bear standard American English accents 
while antagonists often display markedly non-standard accents. Humorous characters, 
much like Sapir’s analysis of Nootka storytelling, often feature contrived and unrealistic 
accents that hyperbolize their marked features for comedic effect. The distribution of 
quantity of speech between genders further suggests prescriptive social norms regarding 
modeled speech behaviors for audiences. The pairing of exaggerated visual display in 
animation and exaggerated speech forms of animated characters iconizes racial and 
ethnic groups in contrast to the American audience, the home nation and demographic 
target of the Disney Corporation. 
 Lippi-Green does not analyze written language in animated films. Her analysis 
does not involve the translations of this films into languages other than English, despite 
Disney’s global domination of animated media. While Lippi-Green notes the narrative 
settings of films in her analysis of nomenclature, expected accent portrayal, and the 
social symbols conveyed, I analyze Japanese animation series for American audiences. I 
do so to emphasize the use of written language in subtitles for non-standard usage. If the 
audio track is presented in a language unknown to the audience, the written form of 
language in subtitles must pair with the visual imagery to convey semantic meaning. 
The cases I present involve non-standard usage in subtitles as well as ideologically 
charged narrative elements. 
 The primacy granted to spoken language as means for social science 
investigation should be extended to non-spoken language modes. Non-spoken language, 
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I hold, can convey ideologically charged affective judgments, though it is often 
assumed that such judgments are the result of the content of language artifacts rather 
than of the form. This assumption is derived from the sterilizing practice of 
standardization in literacy and the dismissal of social praxis regarding written language 
as either “correct” in its conformity to the standard or “stylistic” on the part of an 
idiosyncratic author, a result of theories of grammaticality as opposed to theories of 
communicative competence. 
 Standardized written language is a unique entity, different from spoken 
language, yet people in general all-too-often equate the two. This is because our 
treatment of learning to read and write in compulsory education focuses on correct and 
incorrect. There is no room for variation in the forms of written language, at least not as 
it commonly occurs in our daily lives. Take this hypothetical example of a classroom 
correction:  
 STUDENT: Me and Sean are going to meet tomorrow about my writing! 
 TEACHER: That’s “Sean and I,” Student. Would you say “Me going to the 
store?” 
It wouldn’t matter if the student pronounced “Sean” as [ʃɔn] or [ʃan], “going” as [ɡoɪŋ] 
or [ɡənʌ], or “my” as [mai] or [mɐ]. The object of the teacher’s correction is the 
improper selection of the first person object pronoun instead of the first person subject 
pronoun, targeting lexical choice instead of pronunciation. The only way we can 
quantify this through pedagogy involves testing for correctness, usually through written 
means. We have grade school classes separately designated for reading, writing, and 
literature, but no such class exists for pronunciation. Perhaps the closest language test 
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method that uses oral means is the spelling bee, which once again emphasizes only 
correctness. How could pronunciation factor into a competition where the word you are 
given to spell is pronounced for you as it is revealed?  
 Language standardization influences attention to speech as well as with writing. 
Anything written is written with a distinct purpose. However, speech is considered 
unconstrained by comparison. Speech is immediate, though it can be premeditated. It is 
worth noting that speech being “premeditated” retains intentional ambiguity between 
the tone, register, and delivery (such as registers of newscasters, game show hosts, or 
preachers) and the content (a prepared speech such as the State of the Union address). 
This ambiguity is lessened to some extent, however, as prepared speeches of the latter 
sort are generally formalized within a specific context. The intrinsic elements of that 
context have some bearing on the anticipated tone, register, and delivery—transforming 
the utterance into a performance event. 
 A news reporter’s ability to meet the standard expectation of performing his 
professional role is essential both to his employer and for his employment. This 
supersedes proficiency in language production; one must first be a speaker before one 
can be a specialized speaker. The reporter thus refines (deliberately, with attention and 
intention) his natural speech to match the standard of his specialized role as a speaker 
on a public news broadcast.  
 Both the performative and natural speech occur in everyday life. When 
documented and juxtaposed, any analysis of speech styles that privileges one over the 
other demands further context. Consider these mutually exclusive speech types as a 
continuum. The graded scale distances the two types as distinct from each other, which 
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we can readily observe. Interpreting a speech event demands some form of rubric. 
While the graded scale designates a relation between its two poles, it does not entail a 
perspectival basis, which the analysis then informs by its area of focus. The popular 
conception of the newscast voice as a standard register privileges the expected 
presentation over the reporter’s natural voice. The public expectation of the reporter’s 
professional tenor is considered more authentic than the underlying speech of the 
reporter’s private persona.  
 While linguists recognize attention to speech as a factor in elicitation, what 
exactly is its function? When speakers attend to presentation, they measure themselves 
against the standardized form and aim for correctness. Correctness is relative to the 
specifics of the speech community in question. Speakers of national-level languages 
often uphold ideologies of standardization, despite confusion and misbelief regarding 
standard features. Ethnologue defines standardization as “the development of a norm 
that overrides regional and social dialects.” How does this definition apply to a 
language such English, listed as a national language in 52 countries and spoken 
(differently) the world over? Furthermore, regardless of academic debate over what 
constitutes a language and a dialect, and how to classify those distinctions, what effect 
(if any) does this have on the perception of language by the general populace of 
international speech communities (such as “English speakers”)? 
 In Netflix’s presentation of the anime series My Bride Is a Mermaid, the closed 
captions displayed deviance from standard American English from one character to the 
next, but with a distinct pattern of consistency for each character. This necessarily 
intentional representation of accent in written form clearly marks certain characters as 
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members of separate speech communities. Perhaps this demarcation is just a literary 
trope employed to make fictional characters more dynamic—merely an element of 
narrative technique with only aesthetic implications. However, when analyzed as 
artifacts of language, these systematized depictions of character identity reveal deeper 
implications. 
 It is worth noting that the speech from this source is not empirical linguistic data 
for phonological analysis. I do not speak Japanese, and this examination will not 
include any attempt to parse the Japanese speech of the voice actors in the show. 
Neither will I address whether or not this series is an accurate depiction of Japanese 
culture in reality. It is explicitly fictitious. Instead, I focus on whether or not the 
deliberate manipulation of standard American English via subtitles in My Bride Is a 
Mermaid demonstrates ideological valence in intercultural transmission. When subtitles 
appear, they are necessarily created by some person in the course of video production. 
This does not entail a specific degree of attention to cultural themes in translation, but is 
reflective of transferring grammatically encoded meaning to disparate audiences. Does 
the marked use of non-standard language in subtitles influence our perceptions of 
character and culture when the audience is not attuned to the information embedded in 
the original language track? And if it does influence perception, to what extent and 
why? 
 The manga 瀬戸の花嫁 (Seto no Hanayome, “The Inland Sea Bride”) and its 
serial television adaptation, My Bride Is a Mermaid, unfolds an imaginative story of 
young love between protagonists Nagasumi and his wife, Sun. Written by Tahiko 
Kimura, the original manga (the American equivalent of manga being comic books) 
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comprises 16 volumes published by Square Enix Holdings from 2002 to 2010. The 
anime series (an animated television adaptation), released in 2007 by production studios 
Gonzo K.K. and Anime International, contains 26 episodes, each 24minutes long, 
directed by Seiji Kishi. The anime reached the United States in 2010 through distributor 
Funimation Entertainment with an American English audio language track. The 
Association of Japanese Animations’ 2014 Report on the Japanese Animation Industry 
notes that in 2013 “the estimated amount spent in the animation and animation related 
market” was approximately ¥1,491 billion ($12.6 billion), with North America 
accounting for 18.9% of licensed distribution contracts. 
 The Inland Sea Bride is a shonen manga/anime (少年漫画,”Boys’ comic”) 
intended for male audiences approximately ages 8 to 18. It is the most popular genre of 
manga and the counterpart of the shojo (少女漫画, “Young woman’s comic”). These 
“genres” are umbrella terms for the intended audience, not systematized narrative 
structures. Much like the Young Adult category of books in American publishing, 
manga labeled shonen is unlimited in scope regarding content. Themes include real 
human experiences with relationships, emotions, and personal growth, but these themes 
are frequently set in impossible and fantastic situations. The Inland Sea Bride’s 
television serialization My Bride Is a Mermaid takes place in modern day Japan with a 
cast of both humans and sentient, anthropomorphic sea creatures. 
 The plot of My Bride Is a Mermaid revolves around Michishio Nagasumi, a 
junior-high school student who travels from his home in Saitama, Saitama Prefecture, 
Japan, to an unspecified town on the Seto Inland Sea (which spans much of the southern 
coast of Honshu) for a family vacation. Nagasumi nearly drowns while swimming, but 
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is saved by Seto Sun, a mermaid. Nagasumi discovers that Sun’s family is Yakuza 
(Japanese gangsters) and that in order to avoid a merfolk-gangster death sentence, he 
must marry into the family. Wacky antics ensue as a chivalric bride, her overprotective 
mob father, and his band of thug henchmen splash into Nagasumi’s life.  
 The first instance of non-standard American English in subtitles occurs in the 
pilot episode when Nagasumi and his family arrive at his grandmother’s house.  
NAGASUMI: (Kneeling at the family altar beside his grandmother) Did I do it 
right, Grandma? 
GRANDMA: Yep! That made yer grampa happy. 
Only four characters have spoken at this point in the show: Nagasumi, his father, his 
mother, and his grandmother. But while Nagasumi and his parents are consistently 
represented with standard English, Grandma’s subtitles indicate a marked difference in 
her speech with the substitution of “yer” for “your.” While Grandma only appears in the 
first three episodes, during her screentime she exhibits only one token of “you” while 
making introductions with Sun. Grandma is prone to ending progressives with –in’ 
instead of –ing. This substitution is common phonologically in American English, and 
is notated as /-ɪŋ/ => /-ɪn/. Yet this is not phonologically represented in the anime, but 
orthographically represented. 
 The most common occurrences of variation involve second-person pronouns 
(“ya”) and progressive suffixation (-in’), but several other approximations appear. In the 
first episode, when Nagasumi meets his future father-in-law, Seto Gozaburo, the leader 
of Seto Fish Commission and Yakuza boss of the Inland Sea, Gozaburo threatens that to 
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protect his family’s mermaid identities, “…we’ll hafta kill every last human that knows 
about us”. 
 In My Bride Is a Mermaid, systematic dialect distribution in English subtitles 
informs the audience of social stratification. The fictional content of the narrative is set 
in the real locations of contemporary Japan in the city of Saitama and the coastal region 
along the Seto Inland Sea. The original Japanese audience would be as familiar with the 
customs and locations of the story as an American would be with, say, New York City 
and the generic Midwest; even without having experienced those places firsthand, one 
is predisposed to have a cultural concept of what life is like there by media presentation. 
When My Bride Is a Mermaid is viewed by an American audience, these national-level 
familiarities disappear, leaving the viewer without cultural context at a localized level. 
This does not indicate that all narrative elements are devoid of context, but rather that 
while only residents and participants will be familiar with localized context. While each 
U.S. state has its own local festivals, residents of all states generally recognize similar 
features of festivals despite their unique locations. However, nuances of regional 
dialects and cultural traditions are more common and more identifiable to persons 
native to or familiar with the national-level community. The use of non-standard 
subtitle forms in My Bride Is a Mermaid show how Sapir’s variation as a performance 
technique can extend from the spoken domain to the written.  
 Not all anime exist within a national or linguistic vacuum. In contrast to stories 
like My Bride Is a Mermaid that incorporate fantasy elements in a presumably real 
setting, series like Gosick and Black Butler negotiate cultural, national, and linguistic 
boundaries through the presentation of narrative content in language.  
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 Gosick (ゴシック), published as a light novel (the American equivalent being 
the graphic novel) and manga series by author Kazuki Sakuraba, was adapted as anime 
in 2011. The story takes place in 1924 in a fictitious European monarchy, Sauville, 
depicted as between France and Italy. The protagonist Kazuya Kojo is a Japanese 
transfer student who befriends the isolated but brilliant Victorique de Blois. The 
original audio track features Japanese speech for all characters, yet several instances 
throughout the series challenge story-space transmission of language. Visual depictions 
of writing reveal French as the dominant language despite the Japanese dialogue, 
understandably selected for the purposes of authorship and distribution as media 
entertainment in Japan. However, in the fifth episode, when Victorique counts numbers 
as she ascends 13 steps of a staircase, she does so with the French “un, deux, trois…” as 
opposed to “ichi, ni, san...” in Japanese. A handful of French colloquialisms emerge 
throughout the series, most notably “la vie en rose” during a musical performance (no 
relation to the 1946 Edith Piaf song of that name).  
 The most puzzling linguistic interaction occurs in the Gosick series finale. As 
the narrative progresses, an impending war forces Kazuya back to Japan to serve in the 
military, and Victorique attempts to find him there. When they are at last reunited, 
Kazuya finds Victorique awaiting him in the company of his sister. The two women 
separate from each other at the dock where discharged soldiers are met by loved ones, 
and Kazuya approaches Victorique with a few sentences in Japanese. Moments later, 
Kazuya’s sister appears and asks Kazuya, in Japanese, what Victorique is saying as “the 
English and French I learned at the girls’ school wasn’t enough to get through to her” 
(Gosick 24, 22:39). Clearly the use of Japanese for conversation throughout the show is 
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due to the demographic audience, not the narrative realm itself or the characters who 
inhabit it. Yet the juxtaposition of Japanese speech and the semantic meaning of the 
exchanges between Kazuya, his sister, and Victorique demonstrate this quirk of 
linguistic identity portrayal. That Kazuya’s sister cannot understand the language 
Victorique speaks is conveyed by non-linguistic cues, as with gesture and the unilateral 
flow of spoken discourse—the two cannot linguistically interact, and thus when one 
speaks the other is unable to answer verbally, despite the presentation of each as 
homogenous in the favored language of the audience. This is a speech act in a tiered 
narrative discourse. The broad discourse of the series is to convey the story to the 
audience, which prescribes the Japanese vocal track that accompanies the visual 
depiction. Yet within the story narrative itself, the locutionary acts of characters create 
an illocutionary offering to the audience, the perlocution of which is for the audience to 
dismiss the inherent contradiction of the linguistic content (that Victorique and 
Kazuya’s sister do not share a common tongue) in favor of the implication directly 
contrasted by their mutual, yet non-interlocutive Japanese speech. The event of the 
sister’s speech is a narrative device deployed through linguistic means that defines the 
relationship of linguistic boundaries that cannot be perceived linguistically in the 
audiovisual medium.  
 Another period series, Black Butler (黒執事)(2008-2010), takes place in 
Victorian-era London. The manga, penned by Yana Toboso, was first published in 2006 
and continues today. Its anime adaptations have endured multiple discontinuous runs, 
the first airing in 2008 by director Toshiya Shinohara. The original vocal track is 
Japanese, though frequent snippets of gratuitous English appear. The premise of the 
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series involves Lord Ciel Phantomhive, an adolescent boy who inherits his family’s title 
after a tragedy that claims his parents’ lives—and presumably his own. Hell-bent on 
revenge and unwilling to succumb to his mortality, Ciel literally makes a deal with the 
devil, procuring the services and protection of a demon butler, Sebastian, who will obey 
his every command in exchange for Ciel’s soul upon completion of his vengeance.  
 Numerous other-worldly characters appear in Black Butler, including Grell 
Sutcliff. Grell is a grim reaper (shinigami, or “lord/god of death”), an androgynous, 
flamboyant character whose job as a collector of souls allows her/him to accompany—
and argue with—Ciel and Sebastian on numerous occasions. There is no definitive 
claim to Grell’s sex or gender; while voiced by male voice actors in both the Japanese 
original (Jun Fukuyama) and English dub (Daniel Fredrick), Grell fluctuates in 
presenting as both male and female within exchanges, episodes, and the entire series. 
She/He is infatuated with Sebastian, demonstrating her/his affections most notably 
through wordplay with Sebastian’s name.  
 In English, “Sebastian” is most often pronounced [səˈbæsʧən] or [səˈbæstiən]. In 
Black Butler, Ciel addresses his butler as [ˈsebastian], a phonetic realization of the 
name’s spelling. Grell, however, calls him [ˈsebasˌʧan], which surfaces in English 
subtitles as “Sebas-chan.” From a purely auditory perspective, the differences between 
these tokens only involve Grell’s heightened secondary stress and the substitution of the 
voiceless postalveolar affricate [ʧ] for Ciel’s maximal syllable [ti], the voiceless 
alveolar plosive onset and front, high, unrounded sonorant vowel. These differences 
reflect the alternation between [ʧ] and [ti] in English variants, making them entirely 
recognizable without written cues. But the suffix –chan is a diminutive morphological 
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marker, deictically binding the speaker to the referent as a term of endearment 
permissible only in certain social relationships. To address someone with –chan 
indicates familiarity, emotional closeness, or affection, and is often bound by age and 
gender constraints. For a younger person to address their senior with –chan is 
considered rude and disrespectful (with the exception of a grandchild to grandparents); 
for a female to address a male with –chan implies either her acceptance of him as a dear 
younger friend or as her intended romantic partner. It is generally more acceptable to 
address females with –chan than it is to address males; the divide on junior/senior 
honorifics among males who are not emotionally tight-knit favors a senior addressing 
his junior with –kun and the reverse with –san (respectful), -sama (highly respectful), or 
a designated title, such as sensei (teacher) or senpai (literally “upperclassman”). Thus, 
Grell’s clever pun on Sebastian’s name involves a cultural phenomenon of Japanese 
honorifics that would pass unnoticed by English audiences as English does not 
necessarily mark honorific relationships morphologically by affixation. Instead, English 
utilizes title particles, like “Mrs.” or standalone lexifiers like “sir” to denote deictic 
deference.  
 Black Butler treats cultural differences between characters in interesting ways. 
While Sebastian performs his household duties with superhuman prowess, it is clear 
that some of the narrative events are educational in purpose. Each episode includes at 
least one instance of tea service—a staple of British culture recognized the world over. 
Sebastian explains the type of tea being served for both its geographic origins and 
characteristics as well as food pairings that complement the tea of the day that a British 
lord might be expected to enjoy. In the first episode, the incompetent household 
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servants (chef, maid, and groundskeeper) destroy the garden, tableware, and dinner 
prepared for an honored guest in their zeal to exceed Sebastian’s expectations of them. 
Sebastian saves the day by converting the toxified yard (overdosed with weed killer) 
into a Japanese rock garden with sand and gravel, carves away the scorched prime rib 
crust to obtain strips of rare beef from within, and serves the dish as the classic Japanese 
donburi bowl in the porcelain dishes that survived the maid’s cataclysm with the 
matching plates. The guest is astonished at Sebastian’s aptitude (as are the servants), 
and praises the perceived authenticity of the cultural theme his host has prepared; 
Sebastian responds with his trademark pun: “I am merely one hell of a butler.”  
 Throughout Black Butler, Chinese and Indian characters are introduced, each of 
whom play to cultural stereotypes in their character design and behaviors. Given the 
expanse of the British Empire in the late 19th century, the addition of characters Lau 
and Prince Soma are not surprising, yet the portrayal of their cultures is primarily 
pejorative. Lau is the representative of a Chinese trading company and incidentally runs 
an opium den, one of many illegal operations he oversees as the head of the Qing Bang 
mafia. Prince Soma is a childish son of the Raja of Bengal, oblivious to the emotions 
and motives of others and an entirely self-absorbed caricature of wealthy, privileged 
royalty. During a national curry competition, Sebastian produces the “curry bun,” a 
delectable beef curry enclosed in dough and fried. Queen Victoria praises his dish for its 
kindness in that it requires no silverware, no place setting, and can be enjoyed equally 
by the rich and poor, the old and young, the busy and the bored. The choice of 
“kindness” as a characteristic is fascinating; it would clearly have been labeled 
“convenience” in the United States. This depiction of (presumably) Japanese values in a 
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historic British setting (albeit fiction), juxtaposed with the backstabbing and divisive 
characters of Indian citizens and the nonchalantly murderous Chinese 
criminal/businessman seemed propagandized in more ways than one. Especially in 
animated form, the exaggerated differences in dress, appearance, and behavior socially 
mark Agni, Soma, Lau, and Mao-Ren (Lau’s doll-like, mostly-silent female companion) 
as exotified others. 
 All cartoons distort the human form to some extent. Unlike live-action films 
which directly record living individuals, animated media necessarily index humans but 
are not iconic of humans in the way that a photograph would be. The most advanced 
attempts to recreate humans in animated form enter the “uncanny valley,” a visual 
depiction so similar yet so markedly different from reality that the image itself becomes 
aesthetically repulsive. Control over the visual representation of narrative in cartoon 
films entails a directorial intention. The images that create the video sensory output are 
necessarily manufactured, both in symbolic content and material production, for the 
purposes of narrative continuity and marketable appeal. Illustrations are especially 
liberal with representational manipulation, as is the case with political cartoons that 
exaggerate physical characteristics of popular or influential persons. Yet the degree of 
hyperbole present in animation ranges across a stylistic scale that varies widely among 
genres and individual artists. Illustrations emphasize characteristics by simplifying and 
exaggerating imagery, controlling the spatiotemporal progression of both experienced 
time-of-narrative (the audience duration) and narrative-time (mimetic story duration), 
and being unbound by external spatial constraints (as are photographic images). 
74 
 
Through these means, the sculpted progression of paired image and aural content 
creates semantic frames for audience sensory interpretation via sight and sound. 
 Aesthetic representations of narrative discourse in animated media create 
cognitive frames in the minds of audiences—frames that may or may not accurately 
index reality (and may or may not be recognized as doing so) and frames that have 
categorical (and potentially prototypical) referential quality. In the event of lived 
experience, individuals construct frames as reference markers for transpired events. In 
cases where no experiential frames exist as direct or approximate pattern similarity, 
animated media presents an experiential event that can construct cognitive frames for 
future interpretation. These constructed frames are mediated by enculturation (both 
teller/presentation and audience perspectives) and by factors of the event of storytelling 
(teller/audience situation), yet are linked to narrative as the focal story event.  
 Whether or not the frames derived from animated media are believed to be 
accurate representations of reality is contingent upon experiential variables, both 
idiosyncratic and communal. Animated narrative media are exclusively perceived as 
fiction, and their creators embrace that freedom to explore the unfamiliar and the 
impossible, generating iconographic frames that have no extant indexical referent. That 
a potential indexical referent does not exist does not prevent the frame from mediating 
further association with categorically similar icons. For example, if one has never seen a 
ghost (no visual icon) and does not believe that ghosts exist (no indexical referent in 
reality), that does not stop her from recognizing ghosts and retaining some fictional 
prototypical frame that the mind accesses when thinking about ghosts. Animated 
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narrative media provides illusory representational frames that modify categorical 
meaning, both in audio and video transmission.  
 NB: These fictional frames are available, not determined, for mediating 
cognition—a soft relativity that does not entail—but can permit—referential access. 
Furthermore, awareness of accessing illusory frames is a psychological factor (not an 
anthropological one) in establishing idiosyncratic event interpretation; it is beyond the 
scope of this investigation. That film narrative, and in particular animated film 
narrative, creates event-based experiential frames in auditors—frames that serve as 
source domains for the understanding of target domains—makes semantic frames 
inherently metaphoric in nature. This irrational and unreal presentation of narrative-
event content through multisensory storytelling-event observation (visual, audio, 
textual) influences and creates templates for negotiating social experience 
(socialization) through metaphor and ideology. 
 Ideology is necessarily evaluative and arguably metaphoric. Metaphor is 
understanding one thing or event (the target domain) in terms of another (the source 
domain) by comparing and projecting the latter, previously-experienced frame against 
the former, newly-experienced event. Ideology is constructed through the processes of 
iconization, fractal recursivity, and erasure. Iconization creates a mental snapshot of an 
experiential event and derives from this icon-image a cognitive frame. Fractal 
recursivity extends the pertinent or symbolic aspects of that icon-image to semantic 
categories associated with the icon’s content. Erasure reifies the recursive 
simplification, rendering invisible the elements that contradict the icon’s indexical 
referent and strengthening its associative or symbolic meaning. The prescription of 
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social stratification inherent in this frame-constructing process is the basis for social 
markedness; the unmarked element is favored because it is invisible, and marked 
elements are considered deviant or aberrant against the common/natural/standard 
unmarked variant. Given that unmarked features are invisible and require no domain 
transfer (standards represent source domains, not target domains, and thus do not 
project), instances of marked feature recognition entail an evaluation of an event against 
a previously constructed frame—a referential domain transfer comparing frame-based 
expectation with experiential events.  
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Chapter 6: Dialect in African American Literature 
 This chapter examines the linguistic artifacts of African American literature as 
means of negotiating racial stratification throughout American history. The origins of 
literary dialect involve realistic portrayals of speech forms, though literature is not an 
empirically valid source for historical linguistics. However, the use of literacy itself was 
a form of social protest, as was the manipulation of speech representation in written 
form. Once the binary of possible literacy was established, literary style and depictions 
of social groups served to iconize and constrain the social mobility of minorities. These 
representational means, alongside legal and political events of the 19th century, reveal 
how written language served not only to differentiate races but also as supposed 
justification of racial inequality.  
 Literature, as a written form of media, relies on the printed word to convey the 
its content. African American literature both adheres to and breaks from literary 
conventions of American English as a language and as a tradition in prose. The earliest 
African American authors adhered to conventional norms to demonstrate a biological 
capacity for literacy—a radical proposition during the late 18th century—to protest the 
perceived inequality of racism during the era of slavery in the United States. Having 
established the capacity for literacy, stylistic innovation on the part of both black and 
white authors iconized perceived speech forms of African Americans to reinforce 
ideological stratification after the aboltion of slavery. The use of non-standard language 
in dialect literature and other entertainment sustained racially oppressive beliefs through 
performative media by iconizing marked speech forms of African Americans as a 
justification of the post-Reconstruction status quo of race relations. 
78 
 
 The deep and multi-faceted history of African American literature proves 
especially fascinating within the social constellations contemporary to prominent 
publications. The written record, historical and fictive, necessarily entails language as 
the conveyance of semantic and semiotic information, and as such is an artifact of social 
construction. By examining the deployment of language in written form as it pertains 
both to structural configuration and meaningful content, the author’s representation of 
social reality is revealed. The overt use of phonetic dialect representation of African 
American speech in literature from Reconstruction to the mid-20th century was an 
ideologically formative technique that altered of the perception of “blackness” in 
American social reality. While not an empirical reflection of true speech patterns as 
linguistic enquiry, the literary depiction of African American speech was prescriptive of 
racial stratification among extant individuals and communities in the United States. 
 African American literature began before America was a country. Phillis 
Wheatley published Poems on Various Subjects, Religious and Moral by Phillis 
Wheatley, Negro Servant to Mr. John Wheatley, of Boston, in New England in 1773, 
before American independence was declared. Wheatley had published individual pieces 
as early as a decade prior in newspapers, but Poems was revolutionary as the first 
complete volume to be published by a black author, especially as that author was a 
black slave girl, born in West Africa, writing in her second language. This was so 
unheard of at the time that John Wheatley, who had cultivated Phillis’ writing, arranged 
not only to provide a biographical outline but a testimony of her achieved literacy, and 
endorsements from more than a dozen authorities including judges, clergy, and 
gentlemen of political power such as Massachusetts Governor Thomas Hutchinson, 
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Lieutenant-Governor Andrew Oliver, and John Hancock. This endorsement preceded 
the first book of African American literature, and so too was the requirement for 
authentication and sanction from the dominant power group. “On Being Brought from 
Africa to America,” perhaps the most well-known of the 38 pieces in Poems, 
demonstrates the negotiation of power both morally and politically, as the book’s title 
promises.  
Some view our sable race with scornful eye; 
‘Their colour is a diabolic die.’ 
Remember, Christians, Negros, black as Cain, 
May be refin’d, and join th’ angelic train. (Wheatley 2004:219-220) 
The final couplets appeal to Christianity as a political authority in the argument for 
black humanity. While her lines are evidence for the capacity of blacks to master 
linguistic expression through poetic form, they simultaneously attest to the existence of 
the black soul in the religious sense—a forceful proposition blacks are equal in both 
mind and spirit. 
 The year 1789 saw the rise of the “slave narrative” with the publication of The 
Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavas Vassa, the African, 
Written by Himself. The slave narrative soon became a specialized form of 
autobiography, incorporating a direct testimony against the oppression of blacks, a call 
for the abolition of slavery, and a heuristic mechanism for the establishment of agency 
through lived experience. The genre dominated early 19th century African American 
literature. Equiano’s text was published for 17 editions between 1789 and 1827 and 
achieved success in Europe, where it was distributed in its original English as well as 
German and Dutch translations (Andrews and Foster 2004:187). While Equiano 
affirmed Wheatley’s controversial declaration of black intellectual capacity, he did so 
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through prose instead of poetry. With a dual appeal to Christianity and abolition as the 
conjunction of social and spiritual imperatives, he defines humanity itself, and his 
membership therein, in the image of the dominant Euro-American civilization: 
By the horrors of that [slave] trade was I first torn away from all the tender 
connexions [sic] that were naturally dear to my heart; but these, through the 
mysterious ways of Providence, I ought to regard as infinitely more than 
compensated by the introduction I have thence obtained to the knowledge of the 
Christian religion, and of a nation which, by its liberal sentiments, its humanity, 
the glorious freedom of its government, and its proficiency in the arts and 
sciences, has exalted the dignity of human nature. (Equiano 2004:189) 
He notes the etymology of his own name, “Olaudah, which, in English, signifies 
vicissitude or fortune also, one favored, and having a loud voice and well spoken” 
(Equiano 2004:197). Though several of Equiano’s claims (particularly regarding his 
analytical, yet idyllic ethnography of his native culture of the Ibo in West Africa) have 
been contested through historical documentation (or lack thereof), his political 
assertions regarding the brutal oppression of slavery create a symbolic argument for his 
cause. Equiano had successfully educated himself, worked to buy his freedom, traveled, 
and succeeded as an entrepreneur. 
 Wheatley and Equiano challenged hegemonic beliefs through operating within 
the standardized frameworks of contemporary grammar (a feat considered radical at the 
time). Forty years later, proficiency alone was no longer the frontier for challenging 
racial oppression through linguistic expression. Published in 1829, David Walker’s 
Appeal in Four Articles; Together with a Preamble, to the Coloured Citizens of the 
World invokes both in title and form the political force of the United States 
Constitution, ratified 40 years prior. The Appeal espouses an exhortative style, unlike 
the poetic and narrative techniques of the cases above, but maintains the strong 
Christian rhetoric of moral compulsion against tyranny shared by Walker’s 
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predecessors. Responding not only to the Constitution, Walker addresses a posthumous 
Thomas Jefferson throughout the Appeal as direct response to and commentary of the 
latter’s classification of Blacks in Notes on the State of Virginia. Noting Jefferson’s 
claims that “we are inferior to the whites, both in endowments of our bodies and our 
minds,” (Walker 2004:233) Walker quips his surprise “that a man of such great learning 
… should speak so of a set of men in chains” (Walker 2004:233).  
 The trend continues. In 1853, poet James M. Whitfield deployed structural irony 
in “America”; the poem inverts the popular patriotic anthem “America the Beautiful” 
and decries the oppression of Blacks: 
America, it is to thee, 
Thou boasted land of liberty,--  
It is to thee I raise my song, 
Thou land of blood, and crime, and wrong. (Whitfield 2004:484) 
“America”, as literary critics William Andrews and Frances Foster note, unfolds as a 
“sardonic parody of a nationalistic hymn familiar to all Whitfield’s countrymen and 
evolves into a systematic and trenchant analysis of the hypocrisies and lies that 
undergirded ‘slavery’s accursed plan’” (Andrews and Foster 2004:484). The violent 
imagery that follows in Whitfield’s articulate lines emulates the symbolic power of its 
referent’s patriotic affect. By channeling the contemporary anthem and its uplifting 
connotations, Whitfield juxtaposes American patriotism with the abuse of slaves, in a 
disconcerting revelation of national hypocrisy. 
 These selections are representative of precedents and portrayals among a rich 
corpus of sociolinguistic artifacts cataloguing the perception of race and race relations 
in antebellum American history. The primary challenge for Wheatley was perceived 
impossibility. To overcome the dominant social belief of racial inferiority, Wheatley 
82 
 
had to operate correctly within the standard grammar and conventions of English at the 
time and ensure sponsorship of authority to prove (or at very least promote) that a black 
slave girl was biologically capable of doing so. Equiano’s success with the narrative 
style garnished tremendous sales, international distribution, and social interest in his 
Narrative, drawing moral and political attention to the institution of slavery. These two 
voices had to struggle simply to reach their audience, a privilege that black authors 
could increasingly enjoy in the 19th century. Walker and Whitfield continue to operate 
within standard grammar and literary styles, but strengthen the content of their language 
through the manipulation of genre and extant cognitive schema of patriotism and 
nationality. The former frames his protest under the same design as the fundamental 
legal document of the United States while the latter models his resistance in the form of 
a stirring ode of national allegiance. Both genres are politically and ideologically 
charged, yet through the adoption of those forms and their particular referents the 
authors index the symbolic capital of the very institutions they criticize. In the words of 
Prospero’s “abhorred slave” Caliban, “You taught me language, and my profit on’t is, I 
know how to curse” (Shakespeare 1997:1666). Without the context of the allusions 
employed in these pieces, readers of these works would likely have found them less 
powerful and engaging. As time passed, black authors began to use context to couch 
their arguments even more subtly within the dominant culture of the time, using original 
representations of speech itself. 
 After Reconstruction, African American literature entered a trend of dialect 
representation wherein authors would attempt to distinguish accented speech 
phonetically in script. The trend had perhaps begun with white author John Pendleton 
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Kennedy’ Swallow Barn (1832), which depicted black characters with markedly 
different speech patterns and spelling. Dialect representation as such developed 
alongside the “plantation tradition” of American literature, which became increasingly 
popular following the Civil War. Works of this genre were “penned … primarily by 
white Southerners seeking, through romanticized images of plantation life, to recover 
for the nation the forms of power and racial order that the war and Reconstruction had 
dismantled” (MacKethan 1997:579). This genre and style mediated the public 
perception of the cultural, racial, and political grounds of its time, fumbling with the 
structural remnants of slavery and fresh wounds of social disorder. 
 While transcription practices for language documentation necessitate 
phonological detail using a phonetic alphabet, the print literature of the late 1800s 
retained use of the English orthographic alphabet, displaying wide variation in spelling 
and syntax. The literary history of the “eye dialect” attends to this phenomenon in both 
stylistic and critical analysis. Linguistics, as a discipline, disavows the empiricism of 
literary representation for phonological study, rightfully so—that print narrative cannot 
be observed through auditory means precludes it from being considered original source 
audio material. Scripts, word pairs, and narrative recitation are standard elicitation 
procedures, but the speaker’s recorded voice, not the semantic content of the written 
passage, is the core of phonological concern. While phonetic realization in literature is 
constructed, dialect representation generates a cognitive response in recognition of 
marked lexical forms. The association between the aberrant marked forms with their 
character or event referents in narrative in turn iconize those characters or events in 
frame generation, fictive though they may be. Symbolic representations of social groups 
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can thus influence the definitions of social categories or the interpretation of events, 
both real and mimetic. 
 The Oxford Companion to African American Literature defines “dialect poetry”: 
A style that flourished between the 1890s and World War I; its chief 
characteristics are usually identified as a sentimentalization of antebellum 
southern culture, a regularized phonetic orthography designed to reflect common 
conceptions about African American vernacular speech, and an 
accommodationist viewpoint designed to gain acceptance with a white 
readership. (Nash 1997:213) 
Addressing the social stratification and political turmoil regarding race relations of the 
era, this definition focuses on the extant racial stratification as reflected by the form and 
content of literary discourse. An interpretation of this sort requires differentiation of 
both semiotic and hermeneutic import; the self-contained narrative and poetic events 
along with their orthographic representation comprise the domain of the work’s 
semantic content while the work’s existence in a historically-determined real setting 
further inform the auditors of the author’s social vantage point and message.  
 One direct challenge to the authority of literary depiction in social sciences is 
the idiosyncracy of writing and reading. Because a single author writes a piece of 
fiction that is in turn read individually, the act of reading literature is divorced from 
social activity. The internal processing of the semantic content experienced by the 
reader is not an objective, shared phenomenon, but a subjective, personal one. The 
events of that semantic content as well do not pertain directly to the real world, but are 
fictive constructions that mime reality to some extent. However, the symbolic 
representations found in literature generate event-frames that challenge and model 
social responses nonetheless. Note in the definition that phonetic representation aims at 
“common conceptions of African American vernacular” (emphasis added). These 
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conceptions about characteristics of extant social groups highlight the dialect literary 
portrayal as the sign-symbol associated with the African American speech community, 
whether or not that phonetic behavior is truly characteristic of the extant group. The 
marking of dialect literature as grammatically aberrant stigmatizes the assigned social 
groups perceived to produce marked forms, whether or not they truly do produce 
marked forms. This process involves frame generation that establishes a psychological 
association between a feature (accent) and its bearer/producer (speaker) in which the 
deviance (symbolic representation of marked speech) becomes iconized as a categorical 
element of the social group to which that bearer/producer belongs. Systematic 
iconization leads to fractal recursivity. The domain of the associated feature supersedes 
the individual bearer/producer and becomes associated with the category instead of the 
element, a metonymic function that indexes a whole (the speech community) through a 
component part (an individual speaker of the community).  
 Paul Laurence Dunbar’s (1872-1906) poetry has been repeatedly criticized for 
its dialect style. Recognized as the first African American professional author, Dunbar 
made his living selling poetry to publishers and challenged the social presentation of 
African American identity and social politics in his works. In some ways similar to the 
persuasive rhetoric employed by his literary predecessors, Dunbar’s works addressed 
racism and perceived identity in classical poetic form however, he is also criticized for 
strengthening the stratification of blacks from whites with use of the eye dialect, 
contributing to the marked forms of racial perception in both grammar and content. 
Compare these excerpts from “Little Brown Baby” (1897) and “We Wear the Mask” 
(1895): 
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“Little Brown Baby” 
Little brown baby wif spa’klin’ eyes, 
Come to yo’ pappy an’ set on his knee, 
What you been doin’, suh—makin’ san’ pies? 
Look at dat bib—you’s es du’ty es me. 
Look at dat mouf—dat’s merlasses, I bet; 
Come hyeah, Maria, an’ wipe off his han’s. 
Bees gwine to ketch you en’ eat you up yit, 
Bein’ so sticky an’ sweet—goodness lan’s! (Dunbar 2004:918) 
 
“We Wear the Mask” 
We wear the mask that grins and lies, 
It hides our cheeks and shades our eyes,-- 
This debt we pay to human guile; 
With torn and bleeding hearts we smile, 
And mouth with myriad subtleties. 
Why should the world be overwise, 
In counting all our tears and sighs? 
Nay, let them only see us, while 
 We wear the mask. (Dunbar 2004:918) 
 
Between these two passages, demonstrable variation in lexical form appears. Beyond 
the mere elision of coda syllables, as is the case with “an’” and “and” and the 
unreleased [ŋ] surfacing as [n] in the progressive, phonetic slurring obscures the 
interdental voiceless fricative [θ] into the labiodental voiceless fricative [f] in “mouth” 
and “mouf.” In the onset position, the voiced interdental fricative [ð] surfaces as the 
voiced alveolar plosive [d], changing both manner and place or articulation in “dat” 
(that, lines 4 and 5). Modified verb forms display disagreement in absence of past 
participle “have” (line 3) and “set” (sit, line 2) as a command to the implied second 
person subject. Exaggerated mispronunciation is insinuated by the spelling of 
“merlasses” (molasses), “hyeah” (here), and “gwine” (going). . Similar to Jane Hill’s 
(2008) discussion of “Mock Spanish,” the denigration of minorities via the tactic of 
“bold mispronunciation” (Hill 2008:140) exudes covert racism in discourse by 
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representing the other through means of linguistic caricature. While Hill focuses on 
differences between languages, dialect representation of African Americans recursively 
differentiates between speakers within a language, even one as broad and varied as 
American English. 
 The content of “Little Brown Baby” involves direct speech from a “pappy” to 
the titular child. The child is heavily objectified; two lines of the eight shown here begin 
overtly with “Look at dat,” and the child’s appearance is conveyed to be dirty, 
smothered in sand pies and molasses, as presumably the pappy is as well—“you’s es 
du’ty es me” (line 4). The third party Maria is voiceless as is the child, yet Maria is 
subordinate to the pappy’s command to wipe the child’s hands. The child, being sticky 
and sweet from smeared molasses, is threatened with being caught and eaten by bees—a 
not uncommon trope in the late 19th century presentation of the “pickaninny” who 
careless eats and wanders, only to be devoured by naturally occurring predators.  
 In contrast, “We Wear the Mask” laments the necessity of racial segregation, 
ironically mirroring Dunbar’s career as a professional poet. The standardized grammar 
and orthography conform to a general poetic scheme of iambic tetrameter. Dunbar’s 
phrasal positioning retains a rhythmic and rhyming structure while suggesting 
equivocation in diction. The mask itself is duplicitous, a metaphor not for a physical 
mask but for the appearance of African Americans under the hegemonic gaze of whites. 
Further ambiguity arises in the nature of the mask’s “grins and lies” (line 1); the 
stereotypical Sambo figure literally grins and lies while Dunbar’s tone reveals that the 
external appearance of smiling belies a self-crippling complacency with the 
expectations of the dominant social group. Dunbar labels this burden a “debt [blacks] 
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pay to human guile” (line 3), suggesting a blame-the-victim mentality that subjugates 
African Americans as inferior and penalizes them for that assigned inferiority. The 
“torn and bleeding hearts” (line 4) can be envisioned figuratively as underlying 
emotions, but also hint at the literal treatment of the physical black body, referring to 
predatory attacks, lynchings, and hate crimes of the era. Despite the eminent spirit of 
social protest in this poem, Dunbar concedes that the plight of African Americans is not 
worthy of the world’s attention, favoring the complicit “safety” of the mask over 
instigating conflict. The break in both meter and margin in line nine distinguishes “We 
wear the mask” as both the prepositional phrase constituent to “while” (line 8) and a 
standalone assertion of agency. This subversive tactic draws focus to the phenomenon 
itself (the wearing of the mask), but alludes to the persona’s power of invisibility behind 
the mask. This two-fold response shows both how objectified African Americans are 
powerless to be seen as human, but deprived of that liberty instead choose not to reveal 
their true selves at all. Lines eight and nine frame this grammatically by distancing the 
subjects—an implied nonentity for the verb “let” (line 8) and “We” (line 9)--from the 
objects “them” and “us” (line 8) and the aligned left margin (line 9). By breaking the 
meter, displacing the text, and keeping in active voice, the persona’s limited agency 
comes to fruition. 
 The differences in tone and subject paired with the grammatical and 
orthographic representation of speech in these two excerpts almost makes them 
categorically incomparable. Yet “Little Brown Baby” is rife with caricature, stereotype, 
and dehumanization, while “We Wear the Mask” is political, poignant, and rhetorically 
engaging. Without the context of date and author, the two bear almost no similarity. 
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Furthermore, “We Wear the Mask” makes no overt reference to race while “Little 
Brown Baby” does in its title as well as its lines. It remains unclear to what extent 
Dunbar and other dialect poets embraced the dialect style of their own volition, though 
author and critic James Weldon Johnson recalls Dunbar’s claim “I've got to write 
dialect poetry; it's the only way I can get them to listen to me” (Johnson 2004:899). 
Whites controlled the majority of publication avenues in that era, and the dialect trend 
had been established as a literary novelty for economic purposes as well as reasons. 
Authors like Dunbar may well have chosen to wear the mask for the sake of 
employment instead of as an expression of personal and aesthetic choice. Nonetheless, 
Dunbar’s career was prolific, even more so following his death at age 33 in 1906. He 
had published hundreds of poems, four novels, and seven collections of short stories, 
making his literary corpus the most laudable and widely distributed of African 
American authors of the early 20th century. Dunbar’s works prefaced the next 
generation of African American artistic representation, at times serving as the only 
commonly available example of African American literary achievement in rural and 
parochial education. 
 The marked portrayal of dialect in literature was merely one facet of social 
stratification in entertainment. The minstrel shows of the 19th century depicted blacks 
as comedic objects, including the infamous characters of the Sambo and Zip Coon. The 
Sambo was a lackadaisical black man, childish, lazy, and irresponsible, whose simple 
mind did not stretch beyond food and frolic. The origins of the term are derived from 
African cultures: “Samba in Bantu; Samb and Samba in Wolof; Sambu in Mandingo; 
and Sambo in Hausa, Mende, and Vai” (Turner 1997:641). Though it had been 
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established throughout the 19th century in colloquial use as indexical of any black male 
slave, the presentation of the Sambo figure in entertainment peaked in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries as an infantilized, helpless wastrel, thus reinforcing the negative 
portrayal of black men as incompetent good-for-nothings. The other side of the Sambo 
coin was the Zip Coon, an urban dandy whose admiration of prestige in appearance 
belied his utter buffoonery. Dressed in fine clothing and striving to demonstrate his 
intellectual achievements, the Zip Coon was a caricature of a black man masquerading 
in civilized society; despite his attire, his posture and movements revealed his 
animalistic base, while attempts to converse in educated prose resulted in nonsensical 
utterances, mispronounced words, and gibberish. The minstrel theater tradition 
“parodied black dress, dance, speech, and song; and developed such enduring 
stereotypes as the wily but witless rustic slave Jim Crow” (Lott 1997:503), whence the 
name of the Jim Crow era found its origin. The venue was one of few available to 
African American performers (almost always wearing black greasepaint or burnt cork to 
hyperbolize their native blackness) and writers (who, if credited, were seen as endorsing 
the divisive representations) despite the racist veins that carried the lifeblood of the 
genre. 
 Though minstrelsy persisted throughout the early 20th century, a special tangent 
emerged. The “Coon Show” included both comedic content and the portrayal of blacks 
as malicious animals, “featuring razor-toting hustlers and chicken-stealing loafers” (Lott 
1997:503). Authors like Dunbar and Will Marion Cook, as well as artists Ma Rainey 
and W. C. Handy, wittingly contributed to the genre out of professional need. While 
“white men lampooned African Americans for sport or profit” (Lott 1997:502) in these 
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ventures, black performers did so for subsistence and employment in the commercially 
successful venture of minstrelsy. This exploitation carried into film with the dawn of 
motion pictures. The 1915 film Birth of a Nation, directed by D. W. Griffith, featured 
white actors in blackface makeup pursuing white women, one of whom leapt to her 
death from a mountaintop to flee being captured by the bestial black character. A black 
male character had but two choices for artistic representation: the harmless and 
incapable fool or the malicious predator. Black females were even further restricted to 
characterization as hapless objects for sexual pleasure (with the added patriarchal 
benefit of reproducing successive generations of laborers and providers) or as the 
asexualized, obedient Mammy. The Mammy character, most recognizable in films with 
Hattie McDaniel cast in that role, was loyal to her white masters, kind and nurturing to 
his children, and simultaneously the subjugator of the impudent or troublesome black 
male characters. McDaniel, the first African American—and first African American 
woman—to win an Academy Award for the role of Mammy in 1940 for Gone With the 
Wind, was barred from attending the award ceremony to receive her Oscar simply 
because she was black. 
 Following the Civil War and Reconstruction, the freedoms “guaranteed” by the 
13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to the Constitution were legally protected, yet 
vulnerable to social interpretation. The symbolic capital afforded by media in the forms 
of theater, film, and literature created systemic ideological biases that denigrated 
African Americans, largely through the portrayal of their speech (fictitious or 
otherwise). This is clear in instances of minstrelsy, motion picture, and illustration that 
provided a visually indexical referent of blackness conjoined to exaggerated and non-
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standard speech stereotypes, but remains identifiable in socially conscious literature. In 
a mode of communication such as printed prose, only the words on the page could 
instill an image in the mind; dialogue in literature contributed definitively to the 
reader’s association between character, context, and race. 
 The prominent authors of the Harlem Renaissance recognized the challenges 
established by the dialect tradition. Among the more notable literary exchanges 
regarding poetic art and race is the contestation of Negro poetry between Countee 
Cullen and Langston Hughes. In his autobiography The Big Sea (1940), Hughes, born in 
1902, acknowledges Dunbar as a significant influence on his early education and 
literary aspirations. Though less is known about Cullen’s early life, he was born in 1903 
and also regarded Dunbar as a prominent literary figure for his own authorial 
development. A 1924 interview quotes Cullen as saying “if I am going to be a poet at 
all, I am going to be POET and not NEGRO POET” (Smethurst 2007:112; emphasis 
retained). He further explores this categorical distinction in the foreword to his 
anthology Caroling Dusk (1927): 
Negro poetry, it seems to me, in the sense that we speak of Russian, French, or 
Chinese poetry, must emanate from some country other than this in some 
language other than our own. Moreover, the attempt to corral the outbursts of 
the ebony muse into some definite mold to which all poetry by Negroes will 
conform seems altogether futile and aside from the facts. This country’s Negro 
writers may here and there turn some singular facet toward the literary sun, but 
in the main, since theirs is also the heritage of the English language, their work 
will not present any serious aberration from the poetic tendencies of their times. 
(Cullen, 1927:p. xi) 
Clearly Cullen distinguishes the representation of cultural boundaries by contrasting the 
category of “Negro” with national foreign states. His perspective, established in the 
interview three years prior, is that while a popular conception of African American 
poetry (and by extension, African American identity) exists in social consciousness, the 
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division between authors born in the same nation who share the same native tongue 
creates a subalternate category in which “Negroes” are disempowered. 
 Hughes diminished Cullen’s statement in his 1926 essay “The Negro Artist and 
the Racial Mountain”: 
But this is the mountain standing in the way of any true Negro art in America—
this urge within the race towards whiteness, the desire to pour racial 
individuality into the mold of American standardization, and to be as little 
Negro and as much American as possible. (Hughes 2000:27) 
Hughes argues against conforming to the established hegemony of aesthetics controlled 
by white authors and publishers, and against the denial of racial self-recognition and the 
traditions of lived experience he so famously captured in his blues poetry. Instead of 
mimicking the preferred forms of the high art of the era, he asserts that masking the life 
and lifestyle experience a poet has lived makes hollow her words by abandoning the 
“common people’—the poet’s roots.  
[‘Common’ African Americans] furnish a wealth of colorful, distinctive material 
for any artist because they still hold their individuality in the face of American 
standardizations. And perhaps these common people will give to the world its 
truly great Negro artist, the one who is not afraid to be himself. (Hughes 
2000:28) 
 
The distinction between Hughes’ and Cullen’s vantage points is that of social 
perception and the proverbial eye of the beholder. As both were successful professional 
poets, Hughes’ advocacy of art for self-expression counters Cullen’s desire to be seen as 
equal to his white contemporaries. Hughes reclaimed agency through his depiction of 
African American culture while Cullen remained passive to the whims of the 
predominant social authority. 
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 Cullen’s resentment for racial category distinction was mirrored by many of his 
contemporary literary and social critics. George Schuyler’s essay “The Negro-Art 
Hokum” (1926) reflects this perceptual divide:  
Because a few writers with a paucity of themes have seized upon imbecilities of 
the Negro behavior, the common notion that the black American is so ‘different’ 
from his white neighbor has gained wide currency. The mere mention of the 
word ‘Negro’ conjures up in the average white American’s mind a composite 
stereotype … [of] the monstrosities scrawled by the cartoonists. (Schuyler 
2000:25). 
Schuyler reveals the indistinguishable similarities between the environments, activities, 
and subsistence necessities shared by Americans regardless of race with snippets of 
daily life routines. He attacks the presentation of blacks as “othering” by an appeal to 
subsistence and leisure behaviors among the socioeconomic class equivalencies 
between whites and blacks. They both work the same types of jobs, smoke the same 
tobacco, read the same newspapers, etc. Though Schuyler does not explicitly invoke 
class as the mitigating factor in his comparison, he aims to dismantle the depiction of 
African Americans provided via entertainment and print media in favor of an 
ethnographic example of daily life 
 Interestingly, the span of 150 years from Wheatley’s publication to the Harlem 
Renaissance shows an inversion of social tenets. Wheatley and Equiano struggled to 
prove to the world the capability of non-whites to produce coherent, eloquent language, 
fighting against the prevalent notion that this was biologically impossible. Throughout 
the 19th century, that impossibility was uprooted. In its place, the evaluative scale 
shifted from a binary of can/cannot opposition to a graduated scale in which African 
Americans were cemented in the public eye as capable of, yet inferior to, the maximal 
artistic achievements of whites. The development of this gradient evaluation was 
95 
 
reflected in (and perhaps borne of) the political and military cataclysm of the Civil War 
and the ensuing legislation that served as politico-economic leveraging tools. Though 
the legal determination for black inferiority had been set by the Three-Fifths 
Compromise of 1787, the legislature officiated after 1865 (and circumvented by poll 
taxes, literacy tests, and grandfather clauses) provided a façade of equality. That façade 
withered to a mere mask in 1896 with the Supreme Court ruling of Plessy v. Ferguson, 
which upheld the constitutionality of “separate but equal” facilities and services—
legally endorsed segregation. The perception of blackness as an identity, in part 
constructed by print and entertainment media of the 19th century, encouraged and 
supported the systemic conditions in which social stratification was endorsed, both 
ideologically and hegemonically. In the words of W. E. B. DuBois, “the white public 
today demands from its artists, literary and pictorial, racial pre-judgment which 
deliberately distorts Truth and Justice, as far as colored races are concerned, and it will 
pay for no other” (DuBois 2000:22-23). 
 Although far from exhaustive, this brief survey of African American literary 
protest shows how black authors increasingly embraced literary styles and used them to 
combat oppression. The progenitors of the African American literary canon struggled to 
overturn the enculturated view of incapability for literacy; their successors adopted 
stylistic means within that mode of communication to rhetorically argue for civil rights. 
Simultaneously, the popular media of the 19th century depicted African Americans as 
inferior and incapable. When legal dicta guaranteed freedoms to blacks, representations 
of blacks served to reinforce the stratification engrained in American culture. These 
iconizing depictions, formerly engrained by legally-endorsed social structures, 
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reinforced the culture of stratification in opposition to new legislative mandates, 
justifying ideologies of dominant/minority relations. Under the guise of accurately 
representing marked speech forms, dialect representation in literature served as one 
form of erasure in that it hyperbolized the otherness of non-whites and challenged the 
capacity for literacy in favor of “playing at” literacy.  
 These perspectives of otherness as they pertain to dialect representation continue 
today, as evidenced by the controversy of “Ebonics” in the 1990s, and even to the 
extent of President Obama’s selective performance of African American dialect. The 
concept of blackness in American culture continues to entail some expectation of 
speech deformity, just as assumed speech types are attributed to narrative characters and 
the disabled and different in Nootka speech. That others are perceived as speaking 
language differently borders on speaking different languages. The use of symbolic 
representation contributes to erasing and silencing the heteronomy of African American 
speech varieties, strengthening the iconized conception of black speech as uniformly 
inferior. 
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Chapter 7: Grammaticality, Empiricism, and Focus in Language 
Research 
 In this section I show how the trends in linguistic research over the 20th century 
have evolved both in method and direction to favor the collection and study of 
grammatical structures. The empiricality of produced speech as primary source material 
reflects increasing standardization and logocentrism. Within this logocentrism, the 
emphasis of phonetic observation is given primacy because it is empirically observable. 
Fluidity of speech forms is reconfigured through assumptions about language and 
cognition as reducible to an encoded utterance, which in turn favors a model of 
standardization that surfaced as a byproduct of uniform written literacy.   
 Bronislav Malinowski’s Problem of Meaning in Primitive Language (1948) 
addresses the social functions of language, what he calls phatic communication. 
Malinowski espoused a theory of psychological functionalism throughout his 
anthropological studies, placing heavy emphasis on the mechanisms of interaction. This 
sort of purposefulness pervades his work, as does an evolutionary prejudice against 
cultures he perceived to be less civilized than those of Europe. While his treatment of 
“primitives” and “savages” is quite telling of the accepted degree of stratification 
between cultures at the time, it reveals more than just negative biases. Malinowski’s 
interest in language throughout this piece centers on what is labeled today as discourse 
analysis. Much like his psychological functionalism, Malinowski’s forays into the social 
meaning of language describe those of social processes of affirmation that reinforce 
extant beliefs and power structures within communities. Malinowski’s assertions 
regarding comparative inequalities between races demand certain assumptions about 
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vectored cultural development and the capabilities of community members, yet the 
disavowal of these biases, used as an interpretive tool applied to Malinowski’s work, 
reveal surprising insights into the concept of language and interaction. 
 Discussing the premise that words intrinsically contain their meanings 
independent of context, Malinowski differentiates three types of language study based 
on their modes of transmission:  
But when we pass from a modern civilized language, of which we think mostly 
in terms of written records, or from a dead one which survives only in 
inscription, to a primitive language, never used in writing, where all the material 
lives only in winged words, passing from man to man—there it should be clear 
at once that the conception of meaning as contained in an utterance is false and 
futile. A statement, spoken in real life, is never detached from the situation in 
which it has been uttered. […] Without some imperative stimulus of the 
moment, there can be no spoken statement. (Malinowski 1948:240) 
Malinowski builds his comparison between philologists and ethnographers from a vein 
similar to Lewis Henry Morgan’s theory of social evolution, though with somewhat 
skewed temporality. Note that in Malinowski’s estimation, “modern civilized” 
languages are defined by written records (though it is implied that they must be spoken 
as well). This assumption reflects the presiding ethnocentric western view of cultures as 
competing in a linear race from savagery to civilization. In contrast, “primitive” 
languages are those that have yet to develop orthography and written records, favoring 
orality over literacy, while “dead” languages (the source material for philological 
investigation for translating documents from antiquity) are those that succeeded in 
developing literacy, yet failed to sustain as cultural and linguistic communities.  
 It is evident from his poetic description alone that Malinowski favors primitive 
language for the purposes of research. He lambasts philologists and their 
documentation-based research as they must “reconstruct the general situations—i.e., the 
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culture of a past people—from the extant statements” (Malinowski 1948:240) of 
historical record, while ethnographers have those cultural resources at their disposal for 
analysis and interpretation. He clearly hopes to avoid making unverifiable assertions 
about a culture. Thus primitive language research is, in his eyes, more accurate than 
research conducted by philologists on dead languages for two reasons: 1) It can 
presumably be confirmed as true by contemporaries, and 2) ethnographies 
accompanying translations of linguistic discourse “contain the meanings” of culturally 
significant practices, situating the event in its indigenous context.  
  What is fascinating about the third section of Malinowski’s Problems is the 
simultaneous appeal to and disregard for the authority of texts as source material for 
linguists and anthropologists. What he hopes to establish is the importance of 
truthfulness in translation by means of ethnographic clarity. Clearly, then, as now, some 
elements of communication were “lost in translation” when utterances of one language 
are given equivalents in another language. As Malinowski describes in the second 
section, a simple denotative substitution is not informative enough to convey the same 
significance between languages: “The verbatim translation … sounds at first like a 
riddle or a meaningless jumble of words” (Malinowski 1948:232). Only through a 
cultural understanding of performative aspects of narrative and sign-symbol reference 
could he interpret the boasting aspect of the utterance, which he describes as 
“characteristic of the Trobrianders’ culture in general and of their ceremonial barter in 
particular” (Malinowski 1948:233). Through this example, he posits that “to the 
meaning of such words is added a specific emotional tinge, comprehensible only against 
the background of their tribal psychology in ceremonial life, commerce and enterprise” 
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(Malinowski 1948:233). The meaning of the utterance as a prideful boast is not self-
contained; the requirement of external familiarity with the Trobrianders’ practices 
mediates the significance of the utterance from its denotative sequence of events to its 
affective pride in relating the sequence of events in that structural form. 
 The concept of meaning as “self-contained” is problematic here as well. 
Malinowski describes this as context of situation, primarily to distinguish between the 
scholarly methods of philologists and ethnographers. However, he does so by 
differentiating between written and spoken language events. He writes: 
[Written statements are] naturally isolated, torn out of any context of situation. 
In fact, written statements are set down with the purpose of being self-contained 
and self-explanatory … [they are] composed with the purpose of bringing their 
message to posterity unaided, and they had to contain this message within their 
own bounds.  (Malinowski 1948:239) 
 
He claims the “clearest case” of self-contained meaning as “the modern scientific 
book”. He notes that readers must not only read the book but also have “the necessary 
scientific training” (Malinowski 1948:239) to understand it. The propositions that the 
book is “sufficient to direct the reader’s mind to the meaning” and that “the meaning is 
wholly contained in or carried by the book” (Malinowski 1948:240) entail a number of 
assumptions that generally undercut the modern scientific book’s exemplary status. Can 
one who lacks the necessary scientific training obtain the meaning wholly contained in 
the book, or does some percentage of that meaning rely on the prerequisite training that 
informs the sign-symbols of the book’s content of those symbols’ external referents? 
Obviously by his own example, the context of the situation comes into play if we 
simply consider the “necessary scientific training” equivalent to the ethnographic 
description that accompanies the boasting narrative. And perhaps this is truly 
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Malinowski’s goal—to buffer the scientific credibility of the social sciences he had 
come to admire and to which he had dedicated his life’s work.   
 Malinowski then casts his discussion of self-contained meaning aside as “false 
and futile” (Malinowski 1948:240), but it is not clear whether he has made a straw man 
of his own arguments intentionally or accidentally. What Malinowski rejects from the 
philological method is the reconstruction of culture ex post facto from texts alone, yet 
his constant equivocation between language as speech or as writing leaves a significant 
degree of confusion.  
 Leonard Bloomfield takes a different stance with regard to the divide between 
oral and written language. He claims that “’spoken language’ fleetingly renders the 
forms that have their basic and permanent existence in the ‘written language’. The latter 
‘fixes’ and ‘preserves’ linguistic tradition” (Bloomfield 1944:46). The discussion 
surrounding Bloomfield’s assertions here relate to the then-current proposal for the 
Cherokee syllabary, or “Sequoyah’s alphabet,” to be taught in Oklahoma public 
education. Bloomfield notes that the preserved traditions mentioned refer to 
standardized forms of language, and that dialects are “described as corruptions of the 
standard forms (‘mistakes’, ’bad grammar’) or branded as entirely out of bounds, on par 
with the solecisms of a foreign speaker” (Bloomfield 1944:45). He continues to label 
dialect features as “mistakes,” or asserts such features are “attributed to usage… 
interfering with more legitimate [grammatical] controls” (Bloomfield 1944:45).  
 While Bloomfield appears a staunch supporter of written language, it is not so 
much the mode of conveyance as the consistency provided by writing as a material 
semi-permanent form that he applauds: 
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Statements about the relation of standard and non-standard forms are likely to be 
interpreted as ‘defense’ or ‘advocacy’ of the latter. Especially, linguistic 
statements about the relation of writing to language conflict so violently with 
self-evident truth that they can be interpreted only as a perverse refusal to 
consider certain facts. (Bloomfield 1944:49) 
His footnote to this statement insinuates that the ‘self-evident truth’ he upholds is “To 
say that writing is not the central and basic form of language is simply to ignore writing 
altogether” (Bloomfield 1944:49). Despite his confidence in these claims, they remain 
tainted with colonialist ideologies of privilege and superiority of western society over 
the underdeveloped cultures and practices of “savages.” It would appear on some levels 
that the fulcrum of evolutionary progression, in Bloomfield’s view, is directly related to 
the implementation of a distinct orthography and body of literature, similar to Lewis 
Henry Morgan’s requirement of literacy to move from barbarism into civilization. 
 The academic tradition of linguistic science in Bloomfield’s wake carried this 
viewpoint into abstraction, emphasizing not the material existence of written language, 
but the ethereal structure of grammar as the primary concern. Bloomfield’s arguments 
in philosophy of language revere the underlying forms of grammatical structure and the 
academic’s attunement to those forms at the expense of “tertiary responses,” the very 
defense of practices by speakers that he discards in the passage above. He holds that 
speakers who deviate from the standard will attempt to assert their authority as speakers 
to negotiate the marked difference between the standard and a dialect, a layman’s 
attitude that is easily dismissed in favor of the academic’s deeper, more profound 
understanding of language. This is partly a theoretical extension of the concurrently 
prevalent philosophical theory of behaviorism, a widely accepted and varied concept 
that aimed to explain action as causally-imputed by thought. Scholars such as Ivan 
Pavlov and B. F. Skinner supported variations of this theory, which they demonstrated 
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through conditioning behaviors of animals. This vein of scholarship, following the 
empiricist traditions of philosophy and the push in social sciences toward objective hard 
sciences, rejects interpretation of meaning and process in favor of observable causation. 
In Bloomfield’s words, “a linguist who refuses to speak of mental things comes to be 
viewed as refusing to speak of anything which lies outside the borders of physics and 
biology” (Bloomfield 1944:52). He further explains that by dismissing mental causation 
of human affairs in favor of espousing behavior as representative of mental states, 
scholars seek to liberate linguistics from the solipsism of the mental domain. 
 The next step in the dominant theories of linguistic science arrived in 1957 with 
Noam Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures, a direct assault on Skinner’s radical 
behaviorism and a reinforcement of Bloomfield’s emphasis on underlying forms of 
grammar as the “true” nature of language. Chomsky would become (and today remains) 
the champion linguist of the latter 20th century through his manifold explorations of 
how grammatical structures are processed in thought and represented through speech. 
Each step toward objectivity in the empiricist tradition of linguistics has, in fact, 
achieved a greater degree of objectification of the source material, denying the inherent 
authority, opinions, and attitudes of speakers in favor of the lauded wisdom of those 
who study them, however removed from relative cultural context those academic 
authorities may be.  
 This bid for the power of authority, the adherence to a solid standard in both 
grammatical structure itself and the research that reveals structure, and the emphasis on 
processual mechanics in linguistic science leads to the conception of language as a 
mental phenomenon that surfaces in speech, yet is mediated through literacy. By 
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privileging the underlying grammatical structures of languages as the program through 
which communicative meaning is decoded, linguists assert the standards of grammatical 
structure as the best rubric by which to measure correctness. This is evident through the 
analysis of utterances marked by an asterisk as ungrammatical. Logic dictates that if 
there are phrases that are grammatically correct within a language, there must as well be 
phrases that are grammatically incorrect at the structural level. Spatiotemporal 
considerations apply as well, specifying a chronotopic dimension that realizes the 
felicity conditions of the argument in question; i.e., qualifying an utterance as 
grammatical is necessarily directed from the perspective of a certain time and place. 
Take, for example, some differences between British and American English in spelling. 
“Color” and “colour,” among many other pairings in which American words drop the 
vowel “u,” are equivalent in concept, pronunciation, and referent, yet are written 
differently as per the standards and traditions of these two forms of English. While 
“colo(u)r” displays variance in the spelling, it is not considered a heterograph because 
the meaning remains equivalent. Heteronyms are lexical items that contrast meaning but 
share pronunciation and spelling. “Pants” in American English refers to outerwear that 
covers the waist and legs, while “pants” in British English refer to underwear that 
covers the waist and crotch. Here the concept and pronunciation are the same, yet the 
referents are different. Lexical items that share spellings but differ in pronunciation and 
meaning are called homographs, such as “wind” (a breeze that blows) and “wind” 
(coiling or twisting as with an analog clock). 
 The very concept of distinctions between homo- and hetero-nyms, -phones, and 
–graphs depends on allegiance to a standardized version of the language in use and its 
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orthographic conventions. Phonological production requires no concept of an 
orthography, merely the recognition that a distinct sound pattern has an intended, 
socially-recognizable referent. Thus the phonetic [tu] can have several meanings—a 
directional preposition, the quantity of a pair, or something in addition—without being 
three separate lexical forms in speech. These lexical forms are differentiated in written 
English in the forms “to,” “two,” and “too” respectively, although the meaning in use 
can be determined by grammatical structure. However, grammatical structure is not 
always sufficient to indicate a coherent meaning. Chomsky’s famous example of this is 
the sentence “colorless green ideas sleep furiously” (Chomsky 1957). This phrase is 
syntactically sound, yet nonsensical in meaning. Anything colorless cannot be green, 
and color is a secondary property of concrete objects that cannot be applied to abstract, 
non-corporeal things like ideas. While each of these words exist in English, the same 
phenomenon can occur with neologisms and nonexistent lexical items. Lewis Carroll’s 
Jabberwocky (1871) serves as a fine example: 
’Twas brillig, and the slithy toves 
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe: 
All mimsy were the borogoves, 
And the mome raths outgrabe. (Carroll 1999:10) 
 
Of the 23 (24 contracted) words in the first verse of this poem, 11 are not words of the 
English language. None of these novel terms are phonologically impossible with the 
pronunciation of sound-patterns in English; the lines can be spoken without much 
difficulty. Furthermore, the syntactic arrangement indicates to the reader (or auditor) 
some nature of grammatical categories. The familiar “’twas” indicates a clause 
describing state of being, necessitating that “brillig” take the category of an adjective 
that describes that state of being. “The slithy toves did gyre and gimble in the wabe” is 
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grammatically sound in form, but that form dictates the categories of the novel lexical 
items contained. The linking verb “did” indicates a past tense modal of “gyre,” which 
can only be interpreted as an active verb. “Gimble” as well must be a verb of some sort 
as it is conjoined with “gyre,” and that verb phrase is modified with a prepositional 
phrase “in the wabe,” which denotes “wabe” as a noun given that the preposition “in” 
requires a spatial location. In this way, Carroll toys with grammar and meaning, 
adhering to the structure of English at the expense of denotation in his novel 
terminology. 
 Grammaticality as a theory permits aberrations in meaning while restricting 
aberrations in form, thus privileging the code of language over its content. This premise 
goes hand in hand with the concepts of underlying and surface forms in generative 
grammar. The surface form represents the phenotype of the utterance—its appearance at 
face value. The underlying form represents the genotype of the utterance—the structure 
that conforms to the standardized rules of mechanics in a language. In Bloomfield’s 
terms, the underlying form is the linguistic tradition fixed and preserved through the act 
of writing. Malinowski’s arguments for the study of indigenous languages reflect the 
decoding of grammatical structure through the observation and analysis of the surface 
forms, quite literally the utterances of individuals as they are spoken. This should not 
imply that the surface form and the underlying form of an utterance cannot be 
equivalent; they certainly can be. But what it does imply is that while speakers can 
display variation from one to the next, which we dismiss as unmediated speech, accent, 
or dialect, writing is in turn mediated by thought before it can be created. The fact that 
one must actively inscribe written language by some means (stylus, chisel, pen, brush, 
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typewriter, word processor, etc.) necessitates a degree of forethought, including not 
only the medium of recording written language but also the mitigation of an 
orthographic system intended to represent that encoded language for comprehensibility 
to others.  
 The physical act of recording a written artifact of language is not the only 
constraint that differentiates speech and writing. Donald Rubin (1984) identifies six 
constituents of communicative situations: a) medium of communication (oral, written, 
signed), b) discourse function, c) audience-communicator role relations, d) topic 
domain, e) setting, and f) interactive structure. While each of these constituent elements 
is influential in its own right, the medium of communication precedes the transmission 
of content as a communicative event and thus refines the domains in which the latter 
constituents operate. Rubin notes that “writing is commonly regarded as wholly 
individualistic (as in literary theory) or else monolithic and of a single standard (as in 
prescriptive teaching)” (Rubin 1984:216). His analysis addresses not only the physical 
aspects of creating a written text, but also the spatiotemporal elements absent from 
written communication that are associated with face-to-face speech. Paralinguistic cues, 
gestures, the setting of interlocution, and common ground assumptions are among these 
elements, which contribute to the conception of writing as context-independent and 
autonomous. Beyond the event-associated data withdrawn from written communication, 
Rubin examines the cognitive interpretation of medium-derived conveyance. “At issue 
here are frames, or schemata, for what is to count as written language. At the most 
atomistic level, these conventions include expectations of what is more or less standard 
capitalization, punctuation, and spelling” (Rubin 1984:217). He continues to denote 
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how syntactic structures common to speech are excluded from writing (such as the 
passive “got + past tense verb”), while other constructions arise only in written form 
(such as direct quotation followed by the narrative tag “said John”). Though these 
constructions are feasible in their converse domains, the divergence from standardized 
forms of usage signals an authorial intention that calls attention to the discourse. Rubin 
reiterates that “writing is not absolutely context-independent, but is more or less 
independent of context depending on the degree of socio-psychological distance 
between writer and reader” (Rubin 1984:218). He clarifies that conceptions of language 
could be more accurately seen as existing along a “continuous spectrum ranging from 
interactive, spontaneous, and immediately expressive (oral) to monologic, planned, and 
reflective (written) language” (Rubin 1984:218). 
 The notion that language is ultimately reducible to specific, encoded referent 
objects and events is the basis of logocentrism. Logocentrism conjoins the product of 
the word with its concept. In oral speech, the logos is produced phonetically; in written 
language, the logos is produced graphically. Ferdinand de Saussure (1916) notes the 
inherent difference between speech and language: The former is individually produced 
while the latter is a shared, passively obtained system of meaning. His attempts to 
provide a rigorous methodology of linguistic science posit the singular importance of 
spoken language, noting that writing is at best a means to record representations of 
speech for temporal preservation.  
In language, on the contrary, there is only the sound-image, and the latter can be 
translated into a fixed visual image. […] The very possibility of putting the 
things that relate to language into graphic form allows dictionaries and 
grammars to represent it accurately, for language is a storehouse of sound-
images, and writing is the tangible form of those images. (Saussure 2011:15) 
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For Saussure, written language itself only serves as a representation of the spoken word, 
which is the pure form of language. Through this conceptualization, speech is 
interpreted as a vocal action produced by the individual yet social in the sense of a 
shared system of practices that encrypt the thought conveyed in a systematic manner. 
This encoded message, in turn, can be realized and understood only insofar as it adheres 
to the standard mechanics of the grammar in which it is uttered. Saussure believed that 
grammar was a choice, posited for each individual by the socialization of grammatical 
standards, through which thought could be conveyed regardless of in which language 
that thought was encoded. 
 Jacques Derrida’s (1991) analysis of Saussure’s arguments challenged the 
reducibility of the spoken word to the written form. Derrida held that exact meanings, as 
they exist in the social functions of language, cannot be entailed by the words that 
represent them alone. His method of deconstruction argues signification by contrast, the 
meaning of a term being determined by its opposition. 
In both expression and indicative communication the difference between reality 
and representation, between the true and the imaginary, and between simple 
presence and repetition has always already begun to be effaced. Does not the 
maintaining of this difference—in the history of metaphysics and for Husserl as 
well—answer to the obstinate desire to save presence and to reduce or derive the 
sign, and with it all powers of repetition? […] To assert, as we have been doing, 
that with the sign the difference does not take place between reality and 
representation, etc., amounts to saying that the gesture confirms this difference 
is the very effacement of the sign. (Derrida 1991:11) 
Derrida holds that the written sign exists external of signification because of its 
existence, which he describes as a “trace” of presence-absence. The spoken word, 
fleeting and bound by time, exists in written form only in its non-existence in spoken 
form. Yet the concept of written forms as representative of spoken forms, held by 
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Saussure, falsely attributes speech to a speaker who may or may not exist or have 
existed. 
There has to be a transcendental signified for the difference between signifier 
and signified to be somewhere absolute and irreducible. It is not chance that the 
thought of being, as the thought of this transcendental signified, is manifested 
above all in the voice: in a language of words. (Derrida 1991:36) 
Therein Derrida points to the primacy of the spoken word as the empirical, fundamental 
aim of western linguistic inquiry. Existence in production, observable at the time of its 
creation, indexes the truth of the spoken word over the trace of presence-absence 
characteristic of the written word. This phonocentric privilege of spoken language, 
dominates 20th century linguistic research at the expense of written communication. 
 Linguistic research has favored speech over other forms of communication, a 
preference constructed by the conceptualization of language as a communicative 
medium, with subcategories of spoken and signed conveyance. Thus the focus on 
documenting and deciphering language as a vocally produced system of encoding a 
reducible thought only specifies the mechanisms of communication at the expense of 
recognizing social meanings and the influence of linguistic artifacts not expressly 
verbal. This conceptualization of language, predominant in linguistic and social science, 
creates signification through contrast in variation without necessarily conjoining the 
contrasting elements to how those differences operate outside of grammar itself. This is 
a categorical error that segregates language as a concept from language usage as a 
heuristic device of communication. Furthermore, it imbues the concept of language with 
a structural framework that negates the agency of non-vocal forms of expression; in so 
doing it establishes spokenness as an essential, iconized feature of language. Through 
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this empowerment of the voice, the very nature of language is subject to ideological 
biases. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 The primary goal of this exploration into language is differentiating empirical 
language use from its symbolic representation to demonstrate how variation in non-
spoken forms of utterance are erased by standardization. Language is conceived as a 
structured system that communicates thought through various modes of transmission—
oral, written, signed, etc. Each mode displays unique characteristic features that can 
influence and create meaning. The premise that language, once accurately decoded, is 
reducible to referential thought creates an imbalance in the uniformity of language as a 
conceptual category. In western science, the assignation of the spoken form of language 
as the prototype for communication diminishes the potency of non-spoken forms of 
language and simultaneously creates a recursive divide in the social reception of spoken 
variants of language. Through the assumption of standardized normative linguistic 
behaviors, non-standard speech is recognized and stigmatized in social practice. 
Similarly, non-spoken language—such as gesture and writing—is stigmatized as a 
derivative byproduct of the prototype spoken form; this iconized view of language as 
primarily a spoken medium recursively extends to modes of linguistic artifacts, 
selectively erasing the authority and effect of mode of transmission and any 
communicative nuances that are properties of the mode and not language itself. By 
devaluing and in many cases erasing this context, linguistic scientists limit the scope 
and authenticity of their investigations into the true nature of the communications they 
are studying. 
 Language is socially significant in non-linguistic means that retain traces of 
evidence in usage. These traces are observable through sensory perception, yet are 
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mediated by the cognitive processes through which we retain memories of impressions 
and reason our knowledge of the world through experience. I argue that associations 
between speakers and speech practices carry social significance beyond the definition of 
terms and the delineation of communities. Variation occurs between speakers, between 
dialects, and between languages; yet its significance is often lost simply in positing that 
variation occurs. Language communicates thought as a symbolic representation, yet 
language is never merely suggestive of denotation. Language is produced individually 
and thus bound to perspectival constraints; these constraints include productive agency 
in both form and content. Content of utterance is granted the freedoms of topic and 
purpose, yet form is constrained by adherence to standards. Some of these standards are 
situationally determined, as is the case with register and genre, yet form itself is 
conceived as subordinate to the operating structure of language standardization. Thus 
manipulations in form contribute social meaning through contrasting variation, and 
variation is necessarily marked as aberrant to the normative use of language. 
 The aberration of non-standard forms retains an affective character of 
markedness, which is readily observable through sensory perception (whether spoken, 
visual, or tactile). The situations in which marked forms of speech arise are retained as 
experiential impressions as they are perceived. Impressions are thus conjoined to the 
content and context of the linguistic exchange, which we then process through cognition 
to serve as frames for recognizing and understanding things and events. Perspectival 
biases and affective judgments are coupled to the experiences and the participants in 
experience, influencing the assignation of emotional and categorical importance to 
marked forms. This yields a connotative element of social stratification to perceived 
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difference in forms of speech, which are in turn beholden to the mode of transmission. 
Accent and dialect distinction in oral speech serve as the prototype for variation in 
social science, yet the existence of accent and dialect in non-spoken modes of language 
are erased through adherence to standardization. When non-standard forms of written 
language are observed, they are stigmatized more fervently than the mere observation of 
auditory variation. 
 Through the manipulation of non-standard forms of non-spoken language, 
socially implied judgments can be conveyed at the expense of grammaticality. These 
judgments are often directed toward the character of the producer (analog of the 
speaker). When exhibited in non-quotative contexts, the author is the index; when 
exhibited in quotative contexts, the assumed speaker is the index. Thus judgments 
against the producer of non-standard written forms creates an indexical association of 
markedness, often relegated to a pedagogic correct/incorrect judgment or an 
idiosyncratic style. However, the affective judgment in either case becomes associated 
with the producer. The producer, whether real or otherwise, bears the stigmatized 
feature, which in turn is associated with a speech community or class of speakers. These 
associations, derived from perception and presumed standards, extend beyond extant 
reality and are attached to the producing class via recursive attribution. The recursivity 
iconizes the speech class and projects the affective judgment of markedness (positive or 
negative) to the presumed speech community. The projection of affective judgments to 
speech classes, once socialized, creates a stratification between speech community 
members based on the perception, be it real or fictive, of a presumed feature of 
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language. This stratification in turn displaces speech community members in 
imbalances of social power via symbolic capital of linguistic performance. 
 The systems of cognition create and substantiate associations of perceived 
markedness with speech forms and their bearers. These forms occur through narrative 
discourse just as they do through direct interlocution. When narrative discourse 
transpires in non-auditory means, the use of non-standard language displays the 
markedness of the indexed producer’s speech form, creating a space in which 
observation of a vocal phenomenon can be obtained through non-vocal means. Whether 
through subtitles in audiovisual media or through printed literature, the observation of 
markedness becomes associated through the sensory experience of utterance. This 
transpires in the observer (addressee, audience, reader) and is quantified through the 
observer’s frameworks of perspectival bias. The associations thus generated create in 
the observer’s mind a frame of categorical differentiation which can (but does not 
always) result in conceptual classes. The use of dialect in African American literature 
serves as an example of how perceptions of written forms of language imbue social 
significance and affective judgments against extant classes that do not necessarily 
produce the iconized features associated with the class. 
 My final goal in this exploration of language use is to demonstrate how artifacts 
of language contain greater significance than simple grammaticality. Grammaticality 
itself does not permit the fluidity of language change, a naturally occurring 
phenomenon that no linguist can deny despite the rigorous attempts at quantifying 
languages by means of grammatical-ungrammatical binaries. The use of language to 
express social thoughts involves much more than mere denotation. To understand how 
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language shifts social perspective, we must understand how we process language as 
representative of thought, including all the forms through which we use language—not 
speech alone. Even as I write this thesis, my capacity for academic performance is being 
judged by the production of written language, not spoken. To categorize modes of 
linguistic transmission under the umbrella term “language” while disavowing those 
forms of linguistic expression not originally vocal ignores the significance of non-
spoken representation and its role in social praxis. 
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